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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, this matter is before the Utah Supreme
Court upon a Certification of Question of State Law by the United States District Court for the
District of Utah.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Supreme Court has accepted the following questions for review:
Question 1.

Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to an award of lost

profits damages, or instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a former
employee has breached contractual non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee nonsolicitation provisions?
Question 2.

Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages

for tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations?
Standard of Review: When a federal court certifies questions of state law, the Court
"answer[s] the legal question presented without resolving the underlying dispute." In re Kunz,
99 P.3d 793,794 (Utah 2004) (quoting Spackman ex rel Spackman v. Bd. o/Educ, 16 P.3d 533,
534 n. 2 (Utah 2000)). The Court accepts as true the facts described by the federal court. Id. at
793-94.
DETERMINATIVE RULES, STATUTES, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
No interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations are
determinative of the questions of law certified for review.

l

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Once upon a time, this case was "about honoring contracts [and] the financial
consequences of knowing and volitional breaches . . . " Order Denying Motion For Preliminary
Injunction, July 25,2006, (United States District Court for the District of Utah ("District Court"),
Docket No. ("D.") 112) at 1. Subsequently, and as a predicate to this certification, it has become
one in which Petitioners (collectively "TruGreen") have explicitly "proven the fact of damages,"
but nonetheless been denied relief because of questions concerning their amount. Order
Addressing Certification, March 6,2007 (D. 275),1 at 2.
On July 25, 2006, following extensive fact discovery and briefing by the parties, the
District Court entered an order denying TruGreen injunctive relief for numerous breaches of
contract involving several former employees and their new employer/TruGreen competitor,
Respondent Mower Brothers, Inc. dba Scotts LawnService (hereinafter "Mower Bros." or
"Scotts").

Order Denying Motion For Preliminary Injunction (D. 112).

Beginning in

November 2005 and continuing through approximately January 2006, these veteran employees
departed en mass from TruGreen's Utah and Idaho branches at the behest of Mower Bros, and
its principals, Respondents Kevin D. Bitton and Jean Robert Babilis, and began committing
serious violations of their respective "Employee Confidentiality/Non-Compete Agreements"
("Non-Compete Agreements"). Id. at 2. As alleged by TruGreen, these violations included
employment with Mower Bros./Scotts in the same geographic areas and capacities in which they
were previously employed with TruGreen, disclosure of confidential information, and the
recruitment of other TruGreen employees. Id. While evidence presented by TruGreen for
preliminary injunction '"unmistakably show[ed] a likelihood of success on the merits" and
caused the District Court to remark that Respondents' actions "undoubtedly caused serious harm

Submitted herewith in addendum.
2

to TruGreen," in the end, injunctive relief was denied on the District Court's determination that
money damages could compensate TruGreen for its breach-of-contract and tortious interference
claims. Id. at 1, 5-7.
Fast forward to February 13, 2007. Following the District Court's request for a "quick
resolution" by summary judgment and further briefing by the parties, Id. at 10-11, the District
Court entered an order denying TruGreen summary judgment and granting judgment in favor of
Respondents on several cross-motions, including the exclusion of TruGreen's expert damage
witness. Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment, Granting Defendants' Motion to Strike Expert Report, and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion
For Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order") (D. 253). Pursuant
to this order, several TruGreen customer representatives, subsequently employed with Mower
Bros, and later added as parties to the action, were removed from the case ; TruGreen's tortious
interference claims against the employee-Respondents were denied; and more recent versions of
the Non-Compete Agreements were found controlling—despite a prior ruling to the contrary3—
to eliminate individual breach-of-contract claims. Id. at 1-3. Even so, what remained were the
following contract and tort claims against the respective Utah and Idaho Respondents,
substantively intactfromthe request for preliminary injunction:

Following amendment to add these additional administrative and technical employees as
parties, TruGreen specifically did not pursue summary judgment damages but focused instead on
those employee-Respondents who were the subject of TruGreen's initial request for preliminary
injunction and remain the subject this current certification. Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (D. 178) at vi n. 5.
3
In its July 25, 2006 Order Denying Motion For Preliminary Injunction (D. 112), the District
Court originally ruled that these agreements "appear to supplement rather than replace" the
specific provisions subsequently cut off in the February 13, 2007 Summary Judgment Order.
Compare Order Denying Motion For Preliminary Injunction (D. 112) at 8; Feb. 13 Summary
Judgment Order (D. 253) at 32 (finding "that the new agreements are the controlling
documents").
3

o

Breach of non-competition provisions as to Respondents Gaythwaite, LeBlanc,
Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker and Roehr;

o

Breach of non-disclosure provisions as to Respondents Mantz, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc,
Stephensen, Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, Van Acker and Roehr;

o

Breach of employee non-interference provision as to Respondents Mantz, Gaythwaite
and Hiller; and

o

Tortious interference with economic and contractual relations as to Respondents
Mower Bros., Scotts, Bitton, Babilis, Mantz, Hiller and Gaythwaite.

o

Unfair competition as to Mower Bros., Scotts, Bitton and Babilis.

Id at 34.
However, TruGreen's expert witness and report were ordered excluded from trial on the
basis of Fed. R. Evid. 702 and what the District Court described as the expert's inability to
explain how "profits earned by Scotts were in fact stolen away from TruGreen." Id at 37.
Specifically, that TruGreen's calculation of damages, based on marked gains in Scotts'
revenues,4 were not adequately buttressed to survive potentially confounding intervening causes
of gains and losses raised by Respondents. Id. at 39. Consequently, the District Court
questioned whether the entire case should be dismissed and ordered further briefing from the
parties. Id. at 43. Additionally, the District Court denied TruGreen's claim for punitive
damages. Id.
As a result of this order, on February 28, 2007, the District Court convened a hearing on
the impact of the damage expert's exclusion. It was at this hearing that the District Court
acknowledged it did not completely understand TruGreen's damage theory of restitution, Motion
4

TruGreen Calculation of Claims (D. 169) at 6 (basing calculation of Scotts' revenue gains on
terms within the employee-Respondents' respective Non-Compete Agreements and the
assumption 'that courts have considered the gain achieved by defendants as a result of
defendants' actions as an appropriate basis to determine the amount" of TruGreen's damages).
4

Hearing Transcript, February 28,2007, (D. 271)5 at 15:16-18,41:16-45:8, 56:17-57:6, but rather
'thought [it] was ruling on sort of a lost profit damage calculation." Id. at 50:20-51:6. In
response to TruGreen's recitation of the summary judgment record and several exhibits prepared
by Respondents' own witnesses, the District Court tentatively ruled that while Idaho law
recognized only a "lost profits" measure of damages for TruGreen's claims, Utah remained an
open question. Id. at 61:8-63:18.6 Accordingly, the District Court concluded that it would
certify the question of restitution or unjust enrichment damages to this Court, against the explicit
backdrop "that TruGreen has proven the fact of damages but that questions remain as to
the amount of damages." Order Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 2 (emphasis added).
On June 8, 2006, the District Court granted Respondents' summary judgment motion
with respect to the Idaho employees on the sole basis of lost profits damages (which TruGreen
did not principally argue in summary judgment) and certified the above questions to this Court.
Order Granting In Party and Denying In Part Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment,
June 8, 2006 ("June 8 Summary Judgment Order") (D. 286); Order Certifying Questions ofLaw
to the Utah Supreme Court, June 8,2007 ("Order Certifying Questions") (D. 287).7
As this action is thus currently poised, final ruling on the above-certified questions will
have the actual effect of determining TruGreen's relief; the limited jurisdiction of this Court
under Utah R. App. P. 41, notwithstanding. As summarized and argued below, a decision to
sanction or disallow the recovery of Respondents' unjust gains will either permit justified claims
of breach of contract and tortious interference to proceed, or alternatively preclude TruGreen
outright from any relief. Against this factual and procedural backdrop and the District Court's
5

Docket No, 271 references a minute entry of this hearing. A full transcript of the hearing was
requested as part of the record transferred from the District Court.
6
The District Court remarked, however, "If it were up to me, if I were the one that got to write
the law, I would say the Massachusetts court [cited by TruGreen] has got it right. That restitution
ought to be a reasonable measure of damages."
7
Submitted herewith in addendum.
5

notion that restitution is justified in this instance, see n. 4, supra, TruGreen respectfully requests
that this Court answer certification that Utah law recognizes an award of restitution or unjust
enrichment damages for the breach of non-competition covenants and a competitor's tortious
interference with contractual and economic relations.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Conscious of this Court's acceptance of facts as described by the District Court, supra,
but nonetheless faced with the practicality of arguing the merits of restitution on relatively few
o

written findings of liability (especially with the respect to Respondents' tortious conduct),
TruGreen summarizes the following relevant facts as argued in the parties' summary judgment
memoranda. Where appropriate, TruGreen has attempted to distinguish facts concluded by the
District Court in its rulings from those disputed by Respondents:
1.

TruGreen is a lawn care company with offices throughout the United States. It is

the nation's largest provider of residential lawn care and undertakes substantial marketing and
sales efforts to establish and maintain its customer base. Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D.
253) at 4.
2.

Employing many full-time individuals, TruGreen utilizes sales representatives

who are responsible for selling TruGreen programs and services, compiling lists of prospective
customers, engaging in person-to-person contacts by telephone and neighborhood marketing
efforts, and following up with customer inquiry leads. Id.
3.

Branch marketing managers at TruGreen plan, direct, and coordinate marketing

and sales efforts and branch managers have general oversight and control of a branch office,
including marketing and sales. Id.

See Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 4 ("Rather than recite the entire backdrop of
this case, the court briefly recites the facts relevant to this order.").
6

4.

TruGreen further alleges, and Respondents dispute, that depending on their

position and degree of responsibility each employee receives an extensive and consistent
regiment of specialized training, exposure to marketing and financial information, and other
business practices which TruGreen considers confidential. Id; Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at viii-xiv, ^ | 5-33; xxii, ^ 55-57.
5.

Accordingly, TruGreen requires its employees to sign confidentiality and non-

competition contracts as a condition of their employment. Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order at
5 (D. 253); Exhibits Al-9 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary
Judgment (D. 178).
6.

Respondent Mower Bros, is a registered Utah corporation and franchisee of the

Scotts service mark that operates branches in Utah, Idaho and Oregon. Scotts is a direct
competitor of TruGreen and offers lawn care services that are substantially similar to that of
TruGreen. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at
xiv-xv, TH| 34 and 36; Memorandum Opposing TruGreen's Motion For Summary Judgment (D.
201) (offering no objection to the above-referenced facts and paragraphs).
7.

Under the original direction and ownership of Respondent Bitton, Mower Bros,

first acquired its Scotts franchises in 2002 and 2004. Since late 2004, Respondent Babilis has
directed Mower Bros.' affairs and been intimately involved in the day-to-day operations and
development of the company. However, prior to Mower Bros.' acquisition of the Scotts
franchises, neither Bitton nor Babilis had any experience whatsoever in the ownership and
operation of a lawn care service business. In fact, the Mower Bros./Scottsfranchiseentity, as it
currently operates, has only been functioning since 2005. Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs'
Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xv-xvi, fflj 36, 38-42; Memorandum Opposing

7

TruGreen's Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 201) (offering no objection to the abovereferenced facts and paragraphs).
8.

Like TruGreen, Respondent Mower Bros./Scotts has adopted and requires its own

employees, including each of the respective employee-Respondents, to sign the same noncompetition contracts and restrictive covenants as TruGreen.

Order Denying Motion For

Preliminary Injunction (D. 112) at 10; Exhibits B1-9 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178).
9.

The genesis of this dispute stems from the departure of Respondent Ryan Mantz,

a former branch manager of TruGreen's Ogden branch, who voluntarily resigned from TruGreen
on or about November 1, 2005, and within weeks began working for Scotts in Ogden, Utah.
Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 5.
10.

TruGreen alleges, and Respondents dispute, that Mantz immediately began

recruiting other TruGreen employees in Utah and Idaho to join him at Scotts with the aid and
encouragement of Mower Bros, and its principals, Bitton and Babilis. Id; Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xvi-xxii, ^ | 44-51; Reply
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 232) at 11-14.
11.

TruGreen alleges that this encouragement and aid specifically included a written

offer by Mower Bros, to Mantz,
[Tjo provide all legal protection and pay all attorney fees and costs should
[Mantz's] previous employer (Chemlawn / Tru-Green) elect to pursue any
employment contract issues.
Exhibit B1 to Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178).
12.

TruGreen alleges, and Respondents dispute, that under Babilis' leadership,

Mower Bros, pursued Mantz and other veteran TruGreen employees in spite of their knowledge
of the Non-Compete Agreements, with the intent to acquire and exploit TruGreen's marketing

8

and training expertise previously lacking in the newer and less-experienced Mower Bros./Scotts
franchises. TruGreen further alleges that Babilis desired to cripple TruGreen by taking out its
upper management and other key sales employees, thus boosting Mower Bros.' short-term sales
and customer accounts with hopes of ultimately selling back one or more of itsfranchisesto the
Scotts corporate entity at an inflated value. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For
Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xvi-xxii, ^ 44-57.
13.

Since early 2006 through at least year-end, three of Mower Bros.' four branch

marketing managers, including the Ogden, Salt Lake City, and Boise franchises, are former
TruGreen branch marketing managers. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For
Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xxi, Tf 52; Memorandum Opposing TruGreen's Motion For
Summary Judgment (D. 201) (offering no objection to the above-referenced facts and
paragraph).
14.

Respondent Mantz is also a branch manager of Mower Bros.' Salt Lake City

franchise and recognized as the Scotts' regional marketing manager.

Feb. 13 Summary

Judgment Order (D. 253) at 9.
15.

Additionally, the topfiveproducers among all Mower Bros.' sales representatives

for the year 2006 are all former TruGreen sales representatives. Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) at xxii, Tf 54; Memorandum Opposing
TruGreen's Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 201) (offering no objection to the abovereferenced fact).
16.

Mantz started working for TruGreen in 1993 and was employed in various

positions and in various geographic areas for over twelve years. While employed at TruGreen,
Mantz entered into at least two Non-Compete Agreements. Thefirstagreement, signed on April
19, 1993, included a six-month post-termination non-compete provision. Feb. 13 Summary

9

Judgment Order (D. 253) at 9-10. The later, signed in 2003, prohibited Mantz only from
competing with TruGreen during his employment and included additional non-solicitation,
employee non-interference, and non-disclosure provisions.

Id. at 9-10; Exhibit Al to

Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178).
17.

Respondent Lary Gaythwaite was hired by TruGreen in 1998 as a sales

representative in TruGreen's Boise branch. Thereafter, between December 1999 and November
2005, Gaythwaite held a number of job titles with TruGreen, including branch manager and
branch marketing manager, and worked in both Utah and Idaho.

In November 2005,

Gaythwaite left TruGreen and accepted a position with Scotts as its Salt Lake City branch
marketing manager. Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 11.
18.

Respondents Dave Stephensen and Jim LeBlanc were hired by TruGreen in 1994

and 2001, respectively. Both were hired as sales representatives, with Stephensen starting his
work in TruGreen's Ogden office and LeBlanc working in the Boise and later Ogden branches.
Both Stephensen and LeBlanc left TruGreen in January 2006, and soon thereafter started
working for Scotts in its Ogden and Salt Lake Cityfranchises,respectively. Id. at 11.
19.

During their employment with TruGreen, Gaythwaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen

each signed at least two Non-Compete Agreements in favor of TruGreen. These agreements
contain non-solicitation, non-interference and non-disclosure provisions that were very similar to
the ones contained in the agreements signed by Mantz. Additionally, the non-competition
provision in Gaythwaite's most recent agreement, signed in 2004, stated that Gaythwaite could
not compete with TruGreen for one year following his employment in any geographic area in
which he was assigned duties during the last six months of employment. Also, the noncompetition provision contained in the agreement signed by LeBlanc in 2002 stated that LeBlanc
could not compete with TruGreen for six months following his employment with TruGreen in
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any geographic area in which he was assigned duties during the last six months that he was
employed by TruGreen. Id. at 11-12; Exhibits A3-5 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178).
20.

LeBlanc spent at least the last six months of his employment with TruGreen

working at its Ogden branch in Clearfield, Utah. After leaving TruGreen, LeBlanc began
working for Scotts in its Salt Lake City branch. Gaythwaite also spent the last six months of his
employment in TruGreen's Ogden office, and after leaving, worked for Scotts in its Salt Lake
branch office in Murray, Utah. There is some testimony, however, that Gaythwaite prepared
budgets in Salt Lake City during his last six months of employment with TruGreen and that
LeBlanc made collection calls out of Salt Lake City during his last six months of employment.
Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 12.
21.

While Stephensen also signed two Non-Compete Agreements in favor of

TruGreen containing the same restrictive covenants, the later contract stated that Stephensen's
non-competition covenant was only valid while he was employed with TruGreen. Id. at 12.
22.

Respondents Jason Hiller, James Clogston, Rick Deerfield, and David Van Acker

were each employed by TruGreen in its Boise branch as branch marketing manager and sales
representatives, respectively.

Each signed similar Non-Compete Agreements with non-

disclosure, non-solicitation and non-interference provisions, as well as a one-year posttermination non-compete covenant. Upon their departure from TruGreen in November 2005
through January 2006, each of these employees began working for Scotts in the same geographic
area where they previously worked for TruGreen, namely, Boise. Id. at 13-15; Exhibits A2, 6-8
to Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178).
23.

Additionally, as part of Hiller, Clogston, Deerfield, and Van Acker's employment

with Mower Bros./Scotts, each was offered in writing a defense for all "claims made against
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[them] by [their] previous employer" and/or assured that "[ajny legal fees [would be] taken care
of in the event that action [was] taken against a violation of a non-compete agreement with
[their] former company," TruGreen. Exhibits B2, 6-8 to Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs'
Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178).
24.

TruGreen alleges, and Respondents dispute, that following the mass departure of

its employees, it suffered a significant loss of critical management and sales personnel, which
required the transfer of veteran sales representatives from other branches and the hiring and
training of several new and inexperienced employees. Reply Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction (D. 77) at lvii-lviii, fflf 127-29; Exhibit A to
Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Damages (D. 260).
25.

Conversely, Respondent Mower Bros, experienced significant gains succinctly

articulated in a March 6,2006 email memorandum issued by Mantz to Mower Bros.' ownership,
including Bitton and Babilis:
Sales Growth has occurred despite the dramatic drop in Mail Response.
o As a region we have increased sales revenue 46% over last year.
o Last year we had sold $617,000
o This year we have sold $899,950
o While Inquiries dropped 53% — sales rose 46% — This is a 99% swing in
improvement!
o Our sales team has improved immensely over last year. We could
be going backwards as a business or simply staying flat with 3,700
less Inquiries.
o Take time to pat our Sales Managers on the back. They are really
saving our bacon by teaching these guys how to maximize every
lead.

IN SUMMARY:
While we should be very concerned about our current mail numbers, we are
dominating last year's results. If we sold this year's [2006] low Inquiries at last
year's [2005] efficiencies, we would have sold only $288,000. Instead of
dwelling on crappy response rates, we are getting it done as a team.
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I want to make sure everyone is aware of the success we are having and warn us
against just talking about our dire response rates compared to last year. Thank our
reps and sales managers for not turning in a $228,000 and getting us near to the
near $900,000 mark through February!
Exhibit J to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178);
Memorandum Opposing TruGreen's Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 201) (offering no
objection to the above-referenced email and content).
26.

As of that same day, March 6, 2006, the top five sales representatives producing

these results were all former TruGreen employees. Exhibit J to Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178); Memorandum Opposing TruGreen's
Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 201) (offering no objection to the above-referenced email
and content).
27.

A later report submitted by Respondents' designated expert on January 30, 2007,

exhibits the 2006 gains of Mower Bros, by branch and sales representative as follows9:
Ogden
TOTAL REVENUE
Dave Stephensen

$1,452,244.93
$280,744.49

Salt Lake City
TOTAL REVENUE
Jim LeBlanc

$1,398,045.50
$374,705.89

Boise
$777,884.67
TOTAL REVENUE
James Clogston
$ 194,999.94
David Van Acker
$ 184,079.34
RickDeerfield
$120,764.41
Exhibits 20, 20.1-4 to Expert Report o/Derk G. Rasmussen (D. 240); Exhibit B to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum on Damages (D. 260).

9

A breakdown remarkably similar to that offered in the excluded damage report from TruGreen.
Exhibit 8 to Calculation of Claims by F. Wayne Elggren, CPA, CFE, CIRA. (D. 169).
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28.

As stated in paragraphs 13 and 14, supra, Respondent Mantz and a former

TruGreen marketing manager, including Walker, Gaythwaite, and Hiller, presided over each of
these branches and sales representatives, respectively. Moreover, each former TruGreen sales
representative (with the exception Deerfield) exceeded in revenue the next highest Mower Bros,
sales representative by at least six figures. Id.
29.

A discussion with the District Court of these and other facts as they relate to the

issue of restitution/unjust enrichment damages is included in transcript from the abovereferenced February 28, 2007 hearing. Motion Hearing Transcript, February 28, 2007, (D. 271)
at 17:5-20:25, 37:5-46:6, 80:2-82:9.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
With due respect to the District Court's statement of the issues, the order of contract first
and tort second is pregnant with the suggestion that tort damages in this case are dependent upon
an underlying determination of contract damages.

To be sure, all Idaho claims against

Respondents, including tort claims, were dismissed on the sole basis of Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d
59, 61 (Idaho App. 1983), a contract case,10 and the District Court's interpretation that Idaho
permits only a "lost profits" measure of damages. June 8 Summary Judgment Order (D. 286) at
6, 9-11. By disposing of all claims in this manner, however, such negates the recognition of
separate and independent causes of action against the interfering Respondents whose catalytic
actions precipitated the contract breaches and not the other way around. As argued below, just
because a measure of damages (in this case restitution or unjust enrichment) may not be
available in contract does not mean it is soundly precluded in tort. In other words, answer to
Certified Question No. 2 is not dependent on Question No. 1.

Specifically, a case addressing damages for breach of a non-competition covenant ancillary to
the sale of business (and not an employment contract as here), and involving absolutely no claim
for tortious interference.
14

Accordingly, TruGreen presents its arguments as follows:
Certified Question No. 2
The Utah Court of Appeal's adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A
(1979) and its recognition of actual and consequential loss damages for tortious interference with
contractual and economic relations does not foreclose restitution or unjust enrichment as a proper
measure of damages. Cases from other jurisdictions under similar circumstances have held that
notwithstanding the considerations of Section 774A, restitution is available for a competitor's
inducement of massive breaches of non-competition agreements and that a plaintiff may recover
damages measured by the defendant tortfeasor's gains. Moreover, cases which have declined to
permit a restitutionary measure have done so on considerations of limited or no consequence to
this case.
Based on the facts and circumstances of this case and due to the nature of Respondents'
tortious actions, the Court should answer that Utah law would permit recovery in favor of
TruGreen under an unjust enrichment or restitutionary measure of damages.

Specifically,

because (1) the interests harmed by Respondents are comparable to other business torts which
permit restitution, (2) the actual losses incurred by TruGreen are not readily ascertainable, (3)
an award of Respondents' ill-gotten gains would not create a prima facie windfall in favor of
TruGreen, (4) TruGreen's claims against the interfering Respondents sound in tort, not contract,
and (5) Respondents should not be allowed to speculate that gains will exceed TruGreen's
losses.
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Order Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 2 ("As a backdrop for the certification
issue, the court believes that TruGreen has proven the fact of damages but that questions
remain as to the amount of damages.").
15

Certified Question No. 1
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is silent with respect to the use of a restitutionary
(also referred to as "disgorgement" or '^unjust enrichment") measure of damages as referenced in
this case. This oversight is likely the consequence of the rare circumstances in which the theory
is implicated. Courts have recognized that "classic" compensatory contract damages often fail to
address the harm caused by a breach of a contract designed to protect legitimate business
interests such as non-compete, non-disclosure and non-solicitation agreements. In these cases,
the windfall obtained by the breaching party should be available for the non-breaching party's
recovery. If not, as in this case, the breaching party gains from its breach. In recognition of this
principle, Courts sometimes shape a theory of recovery that addresses the ill-gotten gains of the
breaching defendant by using the breaching defendant's profits as a proxy or surrogate to
measure damages. This is particularly true where, as in this case, parties attempt to provide for
recognition of these damages through liquidated damages clauses that would provide the same
restitutionaiy measure. This Court should consequently recognize the restitutionary measure of
damages under contract law for the breaches of the non-competition, non-solicitation and nondisclosure agreements in this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Court should answer in the affirmative to Certified Question No. 2 that
Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tortious
interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations.

The rough adherence displayed by Respondents to generally ensconced tort principles
and Utah's adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A does not easily sidestep the
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Section 774A provides that "[o]ne who is liable to another for interference with a contract or
prospective contractual relation is liable for damages for (a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of
the contract or the prospective relation; (b) the consequential losses for which the interference is
a legal cause; and (c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if they are reasonably to be
expected to resultfromthe interference."
16

question of unjust enrichment or restitution as an available measure of damages for tortious
inference with contractual and economic relations. Order Certifying Questions (D. 287) at 6-7
(summarizing Respondents' argument that Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1006-07 (Utah
App. 1989) "is fully instructive" on the issue of tort damages). While Utah has never addressed
the issue, precedents from other jurisdictions indicate that courts are reluctant to accept the
absence of restitution in Section 774A as an outright preclusion of this remedy in all instances of
tort damages as Respondents contend. In fact, courts have expressly permitted the same under
particular circumstances, including a defendant employer's tortious interference with a
competitor's non-competition covenants. Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts § 129, 1004 (5th ed.
West 1984) ("There is authority permitting the plaintiff to recover the profits defendant made
from inducing a breach of contract"); Palmer, The Law ofRestitution § 2.6, 80-81 (1978).
What is clear from these cases—many of which have been inadequately explained by
Respondents—is that the analysis of unjust enrichment as an appropriate tort remedy in this case
cannot consist of simply looking to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A or to factually1 Q

confined appellate reviews of a plaintiffs lost profits calculation.

Indeed, the cases reveal that

Section 774A is not dispositive of Certified Question No. 2 and courts do not broadly brush aside
unjust enrichment as an acceptable measure of damages for tortious interference. A measured
examination is required of the particular facts and circumstances of the given case, the special
interests harmed by the tortfeasor's interference, whether the potential lost profits or expectancies
of the plaintiff are readily ascertainable and thus alternatively viable, whether the court is
confronted with the peculiar problem of a prima facie windfall in favor of one party, and whether
Defendants' Proposed Order Certifying Questions of Law to the Utah Supreme Court
("Proposed Order Certifying Questions") (D. 277) at 8-9 n. 9 and 10 (citing without analysis
numerous authorities as "recogniz[ing the proposition] that plaintiffs lost profits, and not
restitution of defendant's revenues, are the proper measure of damages for tortious
interference").
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the court will equate tort with contract and limit the plaintiffs remedy to underlying contractual
damages.
As discussed below, the facts and circumstances of this case suggest that unjust
enrichment is an appropriate measure of damages for Respondents' tortious interference with
TruGreen's contractual and economic relations. Given the inherent difficulty in quantifying
damages from mass breaches of non-competition contracts (for which TruGreen preliminarily
sought injunctive relief), that Respondents' gains are expressly attributed to the solicitation and
hiring of TruGreen employees, that issues of disclosed confidential information, employee
solicitation and unfair competition remain, and that TruGreen's damages against the interfering
Respondents clearly sound in tort, answer to the District Court as to Certified Question No. 2
should be in the affirmative.
A.

There is authority for permitting TruGreen to recover profits gained by
Respondents for inducing mass breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements.

As correctly indicated by the District Court, there is no controlling Utah authority
addressing the issue of whether unjust enrichment can be a proper measure of damages for
tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations. Order Certifying
Questions (D. 287) at 2. In fact, as evidenced by Respondents' citations, the only cases
addressing the issue of damages for tortious interference involve circumstances materially
different from those here and specifically do not concern the competing interests of an interfering
tortfeasor such as Respondents.14 Moreover, because of the nature of these cases, the gains of
the interfering defendants were not even in issue.
Defendants' Proposed Order Certifying Questions (D. 277) at 9 n. 10; Sampson, 110 P.2d at
1000-02, 1007 (attorney's tortious interference with partnership entities to the detriment of client
partners); Anderson Dev. Co., L.C v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 328-30, 334 (Utah 2005) (city
residents' interference with developer's third-party contract for purchase of real estate); Penelko,
Inc. v. John Price Assoc, Inc., 642 P.2d 1229, 1232-34 (Utah 1982) (assignee's interference with
parking and signage to harm of lessee theater business); Globe Leasing Corp. v. Bank of Salt
Lake, 586 P.2d 420 (Utah 1978) (bank's interference with leasing corporation's business).
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Accordingly, there is nothing to suggest a recognition ot lost profits as the exclusive
measure of damages. See Motion Hearing Transcript (D. 271) at 63:6-7 ("And Sampson
[supra], while talking about loss to the plaintiff, doesn't seem to foreclose this other theory [of
restitution]."). To the contrary, as the following authorities indicate, notwithstanding a state's
basic adherence to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A and other general tort rules, restitution
of a defendant's gains is not always rejected as an appropriate remedy for tortious interference
with contractual and economic relations. What is more, in states which have denied unjust
enrichment, the courts' holdings are based on conditions of limited or no consequence here;
specifically restricting the plaintiffs tort damages to damages resulting from the underlying
contractual breach and precluding an undisputedly punitive remedy or windfall to the incapable
plaintiff.
1.

Cases from other jurisdictions have permitted recovery of damages
based on profits or revenues realized by the interfering tortfeasor in spite
of recognition of general tort remedies and the adoption of Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 774A

In the influential case of Natl Merchandising Corp. v. Leydon, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts was squarely confronted with the issue of unjust enrichment and massive
breaches of employee non-compete agreements at the behest of a competing employer. 348
N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976). In that case, the plaintiffs business consisted of sending salespersons
into various geographic localities to sell advertising space printed on plastic covers for telephone
directories. Id. at 772. In one year, a number of employees broke away from the plaintiffs
business and thereafter commenced to work for a newly organized competing company in
violation of their respective non-compete agreements. Id. The plaintiff commenced suit against
these employees and the competing business for individual breaches of the agreements and
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tortious interference, which resulted in the entry of a consent decree in favor of the plaintiff.

Id.

At or about this same time, another executive also departed from the plaintiffs employ and
organized a competing business. Id. Following entry of the above consent decree, the executive
solicited the management services of one of the enjoined employees and recruited several others
to sell advertising for his business in violation of their terms of non-competition. Id. at 773.
Actions for civil contempt and tortious interference were thereafter initiated against at least one
of the breaching salesmen, the former executive, and his new business. Id. at 772. Specifically,
the plaintiff charged that the former executive and his business improperly interfered with the
consent decree, 'Viewed as an agreement" between the parties, and sought injunctive relief and
damages. Id.
At trial, judgment was entered against the defendants and the lower court awarded
damages in amounts representing commissions gained by the breaching salesman as well as
gross profits generated by the competing business under the enjoined employee's managership.
Id. at 773. Each defendant was further enjoined from engaging in future activities violative of
the consent decree. Id.
On appeal, the defendants argued that the lower court's measure of damages was
erroneous and excessive. The Supreme Judicial Court however upheld the award, not only as a
measure approximating the plaintiffs loss in sales (determined as an amount which the plaintiff
presumptively ccwas capable [of generating], had the interference not occurred," id. at 774-75),
but also, alternatively, as an amount representing the defendant corporation's gross profits, which
the Court expressly equated with the defendant's "unjust enrichment." Id. at 775-76. The Court
15

Terms of the decree were consistent with the employees' covenants not to compete in that
each was enjoined "from soliciting or selling advertisements for telephone directory covers, from
planning, supervising or managing such solicitations or sales, and from engaging in the
manufacture or distribution of telephone directory covers, either on his or its own behalf or as an
agent or employee of any person firm or corporation" in their respective geographic territories.
Id
20

reasoned that "[a]n accounting of profits," or an approximation of the defendant's unjust
enrichment, joined with an injunction, was a '"well understood feature of actions for 'business
torts,'" such as unfair competition and trademark infringement, and compared well with the noncompete interests harmed by the defendants' interference. Id. at 775. However, the Court also
added,
While the analogy to unfair competition and cognate torts is convenient, it is not
necessary, for there is authority both in the case law and scholarly commentary
for the direct proposition that an unjust enrichment measure is appropriate for
willful interference with contractual relations. Need and reason combine to
support this avenue of recovery because [i] it will often be difficult to satisfy
strictly a conventional tort formula, and because [ii] an intending tortfeasor should
not be prompted to speculate that his profits might exceed the injured party's
losses, thus encouraging commission of the tort. Nor should such a defendant be
heard to say that the unjust enrichment remedy is unfairly "punitive" because the
plaintiff may recover more than his exact loss, when use of a [conventional] tort
measure might allow the defendant to retain some part of his ill gotten gains.
Id. at 775-76 (emphasis added) (citing among other authorities Fed. Sugar Refining Co. v. U.S.
Sugar Equalization Board, Inc., 268 F. 575, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) ("The point is not whether a
definite something was taken away from plaintiff and added to the treasury of defendant. The
point is whether the defendant unjustly enriched itself by doing a wrong to plaintiff in such
manner and in such circumstances that in equity and good conscience defendant should not be
permitted to retain that by which it has been enriched.")).
The Court further questioned a strict equivalence of conventional tort and contract
damages, "particularly in an aggravated case like the [one at issue] where the defendants contrive
deceptively to create the opportunity for massive breaches of contract... by a number of other
persons." Id. at 776 n. 16.
Since Natl Merchandising, other courts have followed Massachusetts' lead and adopted
unjust enrichment as an appropriate measure of damages in circumstances involving a
competing tortfeasor and declined to limit a plaintiffs recovery to "strictly a conventional tort
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formula" as promoted by Respondents. This, notwithstanding the defendant's specific reliance
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and general tort rules to shield against damages and
liability.
In Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., the defendant tortfeasor
challenged the district court's approval of "restitutionary damages" by arguing that under the
Restatement such a remedy was unavailable for tortious interference claims. 885 F.2d 683, 691
n. 12 (10th Cir. 1989). Both plaintiff and defendant were competing gas pipeline companies
who entered into a servicing agreement which required the plaintiff to sell, and the defendant to
buy, specified quantities of natural gas. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (D. Wyo. 1987), affd in part, refd in part, Colorado Interstate
Gas, 885 F.2d 683. When the defendant intentionally stopped taking gas from the plaintiff, the
plaintiff was forced to relinquish certain contract rights it held to purchase gas from a third-party
supplier and could not ship the gas for other customers. Id. at 1456-57. The defendant thereafter
acquired these same rights and began purchasing gas from the third-party supplier for sale to
other customers while the plaintiff remained obligated to maintain a stagnant volume of
unpurchased gas for the defendant. Id. at 1457, 1469.
At trial, the plaintiff was awarded both consequential and restitutionary damages for the
defendant's tortious interference with the plaintiffs third-party contract rights. Id. at 1478-79. In
particular, the jury awarded the plaintiff restitution for profits received by the defendant for
transporting the third-party gas to the defendant's customers. Id. In post-trial motions, the
district court upheld both awards against the defendant.16 Id. at 1479. The court specifically
16

The district court however granted a limited remittitur in an amount of profits which the
defendant did not receive because of a division in ownership of the defendant's gas pipeline. Id.
("Only one-third of the Trailblazer Pipeline Company is owned by NGPL [defendant]. Forcing
it to disgorge funds it did not receive would unfairly penalize NGPL. A remittitur of two-thirds
of... the amount awarded as restitution for profits received by Trailblazer Pipeline Company is
appropriate.").
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affirmed that "[d]amages for tortious interference are based in contract, not tort" and stated that
"[restitution has long been an accepted remedy for tortious interference with contract." Id.
(citing comment d to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774 and, among several other authorities,
Natl. Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775-76). Pointedly, the district court offered no alternative
analysis that restitution of the defendant's profits represented an approximation of any of the
potential "lost benefits" claimed by the plaintiff under its contract with the third-party supplier.
Id at 1471.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the restitution award was subsequently upheld, in which
the Court expressly agreed that 'the weight of authority holds that restitutionary damages are
available for tortious interference with contract." Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 885 F.2d at 691
n. 12 (citing the same authorities as the district court).
In Sandare Chem. Co., Inc. v. WAKO Intl., Inc., the Texas Court of Appeals also cited
Natl Merchandising as authority for its holding that "[a]n unjust enrichment measure of
damages is appropriate for willful interference with contractual relations"; at least in situations
where the plaintiffs lost profits are not readily ascertainable. 820 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. App.
1991). At issue was the appellant-corporation's interference with the business relationship of the
appellees, one of whom had previously contracted with the appellant for production of a medical
diagnostic test. Id. Because of the appellant's tortious interference, the appellees were unable to
pursue their plans to manufacture and market a medical diagnostic test, while the appellant
proceeded to do so in competition. Id. The appellant-corporation challenged the lower court's
award of damages for the appellee's failure "to prove the amount of any profit it lost as a result
of the interference." Id. Like Natl Merchandising, however, the Court of Appeals upheld the
decision notwithstanding the fact that no direct evidence established an amount of lost profits
equal to the judgment. Id', Natl. Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775 n. 10. Because several
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intervening causes potentially compromised such a measure, the Court concluded it was
reasonable for the trial court to have impliedly determined that lost profits were not readily
ascertainable and thus relied on the appellant's unjust gains. Id. at 24.
Significantly, in reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals specifically rebuffed the
appellant's reliance on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A as precluding recovery under an
unjust enrichment theory. Id. at 24-25. After noting that none of the Texas cases cited by the
appellant addressed "damages based on the defendant's profits where plaintiffs damages were
not readily ascertainable," the Court concluded that the Restatement's silence on this particular
issue did not preclude unjust enrichment against the defendant:
The Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 774A (1979) is a statement of the measure
of damages generally applicable to tortious interference cases. It does not directly
address the issue of whether one may recover the profits of the defendant in the
event the plaintiffs lost profits are not readily ascertainable. If the absence of
discussion concerning whether the defendant's profits may constitute the measure
of damages when the plaintiffs lost profits are not readily ascertainable means
that the Restatement has declined to adopt the rule as we have stated it, then we
decline to adopt the Restatement section 774A as the measure of damages when
the plaintiffs lost profit is not readily ascertainable because we find it not to be in
accord with the authorities, which wefindto support the better rule.
Sandare argues that this court has previously adopted section 774A as the measure
of damages in tortious interference cases [citations omitted] . . . We have
examined all of theses cases and find that although the court in each case did rely
on the Restatement section 774A as the measure of damages, none of the cases
related to an issue as to whether the plaintiff might recover the defendant's lost
profits where his own lost profit is not readily ascertainable.

In Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys.y Inc., the United States Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals similarly ruled that restitution was an appropriate remedy for tortious interference with
contractual relations; specifically, as to an employer's interference with the non-competition and
non-disclosure covenants of a competitor's employees. 395 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2005). Like
Colorado Interstate Gas and Sandare Chem., the Eighth Circuit recognized that general tort
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rules and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A did not preclude recovery of a tortfeasor's
ill-gotten gains.
In that case, the defendant corporation hired several former employees of the plaintiff in
violation of what the Court determined as non-competition and non-disclosure covenants in
favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 926. Noting Minnesota's adherence to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 774A, the Court of Appeals held that where Minnesota courts had specifically
contemplated restitution in cases of breached employment covenants and ancillary fiduciary
duties, such a remedy was likewise appropriate against the employing tortfeasor. Id. at 925-26
(citing Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 94-95 (Minn. 1979)
(holding that ccwhere an employee wrongfully profits from the use of information obtained from
the employer, the measure of damages may be the employee's gain"). The Court ruled that
"[w]hen the underlying wrong would have supported a claim of restitution, so should a claim for
inducing that wrong." Id. at 925; but see Natl. Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 776 n. 16
(questioning the parity of tort and contract damages, particularly in aggravating circumstances);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A, comment d ("The action for interference with contract is
one in tort and damages are not based on contract rules").
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit concluded 41hat Minnesota courts would allow a
restitutionary measure remedy in a case in which the interference alleged was inducing an
employee's breach of noncompetition and nondisclosure covenants and fiduciary duties." Id. at
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The Eighth Circuit, however, ultimately rejected the plaintiffs request for damages on
foundational grounds. Id. at 926-29. Specifically, the court did not find evidentiary support for
the plaintiffs contention that the full purchase price for the defendant's subsequent acquisition
was wholly attributable to the defendant's interference in hiring the employees. Id. Such issues
of causation are not before the Court on this certification. Nonetheless, as summarized in the
above Statement of Relevant Facts, ^f 25-29, supra, TruGreen argues that it has presented
sufficient evidentiary basis to support its claim for restitution of Respondents' ill-gotten gains
during the prohibitory periods in question.
25

In Zippertubing Co. v. TeleFlex Inc., the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled under New Jersey law that plaintiffs were properly awarded compensatory damages in an
amount determined by the defendant tortfeasor's unlawful gains. 757 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1985).
The defendant, a supplier to the plaintiff-contractor and subcontractor, was found liable for
tortious interference after contracting directly with the plaintiffs' customer. Id. at 1404-06.
Under its original quotation to the plaintiff-subcontractor, the defendant would have earned
significantly less revenue from the job at issue than what it eventually profited directly from the
customer. Id. at 1406 (Under its quotation to Surf, Teleflex would have received $1,100,320.00
and made a net profit of $715,205. . . . Subsequent modifications to the Nab-Teleflex contract
increased Teleflex's revenue to $3,259,248.00 and its profit to something in excess of
$2,000,000.").

Notwithstanding this significant increase, a jury awarded the plaintiffs

$2,000,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 1404.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs "disgorgement" theory for recovery
of ill gotten profits could not be sustained under New Jersey law and that the lower court's award
of damages was in error. Id. at 1406. While the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of a loss
in anticipated profits, they had not attempted to establish the amount of such loss and instead had
relied on the larger $2,000,000 amount profited by the defendant supplier as a result of its
wrongdoing. Id. at 1411. Relying on constructive trust principles from early New Jersey
opinions and other precedent concerning "the analogous business tort of misappropriation of
business name," the Court upheld the award as "consistent with the policy of discouraging
tortious conduct by depriving the tortfeasor of the opportunity to profit from wrongdoing." Id.
(approving the lower court's jury instruction "to award such damages as would deprive the
defendant of any unlawful benefit of its unlawful conduct").
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2.

Cases relied upon by Respondents do not address the issue of unjust
enrichment or they deny the remedy on grounds distinguishable from
this case.

Similar to the appellant in Sandare, the majority of cases relied upon by Respondents as
authority for "limiting damages to lost profits" do not address whether a plaintiff can
alternatively claim unjust enrichment or restitution as a remedy for tortious interference.
Defendants' Proposed Order Certifying Questions (D. 287) at 8-9 n. 9. Many are limited in their
opinion to strictly an analysis of lost profits where unjust enrichment was not claimed by the
1 O

plaintiff as a damage remedy and consequently not discussed by the court.

What is more, due

to the nature of many of these cases, the amount of the defendant's gains was not even in issue or
of potential relevance.19 Other cases preclude the plaintiff from recovery on other grounds20 As
15

KWPlastics v. U.S. Can Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (plaintiff claiming
only lost profits resulting from defendant's tortious interference with prospective business
relationships); Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 982 P.2d 945, 951-52 (Idaho App.
1999) (plaintiff seeking damages for general decline in sales from experienced replacement);
Dowd & Dowd, Ltd v. Gleason, 816 N.E.2d 754, 770-71 (111. App. 2004) (claim based on
plaintiffs expert report of out-of-pocket and lost profits damages); Burk v. Heritage FoodServs.
Equip., Inc., 11*1 N.E.2d 803, 816-17 (Ind. App. 2000) (review of preliminary injunction and
plaintiffs failure to provide any damage evidence at all); Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 598 A.2d
794, 806 (Md. Spec. App. 1991) (plaintiff seeking to recover only the profits lost on eight
specific customer accounts solicited by defendant); Excel Indus. Elecs. v. Blanco, 1998 Mich.
App. LEXIS 1824 (Mich. App. 1998) (plaintiff presenting only evidence of overall decrease in
sales); UZ Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770 N.E.2d 1068, 1083 (Ohio
App. 2001) (plaintiffs calculation of past and future losses attributable to defendant's tortious
interference); Clifford McFarland Read & Lundy, Inc. v. Brier, 1998 R.I. Super. LEXIS 68 (R.I.
Super. 1998) (plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for lost profits resulting from solicited
customer and decrease in profit margin); Lien v. Northwestern Engr. Co., 39 N.W.2d 483, 48486, 489-90 (S.D. 1949) (plaintiff recovering lost profits it "might have made" on materials sold
directly to defendant by owner in contravention of exclusivity agreement).
19
Innovative Fin. Servs., LLC v. Urban, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 775 (Conn. Super. 2005)
(solicitation of employee by plaintiffs client for bookkeeping services); Barlow v. Intl.
Harvester Co., 522 P.2d 1102, 1107-09, 1117-18 (Idaho 1974) (employees and franchisor's
disparagement of dealership owner resulting in termination offranchiseand closure of business);
Rite Aid Corp v. Lake Shore Investors, 471 A.2d 735, 737 (Md. App. 1984) (lessee's
interference with contract of lessor to sell property resulting in third-party's withdrawal from
contract); Potthoffv. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 771, 773-744 (Minn. App. 1985) (former
employer's interference resulting in termination of plaintiffs new employment); D'Andrea v.
Calcagni, 723 A.2d 276 (R.I. 1999) (minority owners' interference resulting in termination of
plaintiffs employment).
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discussed supra, the fact that these cases, like Utah, generally recognize or adopt the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 774A does not dispose of the question of restitution.
Likewise, the cases which do confront the issue of unjust enrichment present facts and
circumstances distinguishable from this case and make other considerations at odds even with
Section 774A (for example, equating tort with contract damages). Although these courts decline
to award unjust enrichment, each appears limited to the facts of the particular case and does not
appear to impose the blanket prohibition suggested by Respondents.
In the decision of Marcus, Stowel & Beye Govt Sec, Inc. v. Jefferson (a case specifically
distinguished by Sandare, 820 S.W.2d at 24), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled under
Texas law that a plaintiff sales broker could not recover the full amount of profits received by the
defendant from interference with the plaintiffs exclusive brokerage agreement. 797 F.2d 227
(5th Cir. 1986). Pursuant to that agreement, the plaintiff was authorized to act as the exclusive
loan broker of a business for the sale of its mortgage portfolio and entitled to a specified sales
commission. Id. at 229. When the defendant began actively soliciting purchasers and ultimately
completed sales transactions in favor of the business and to the exclusion of the plaintiff, the
plaintiff sought recovery against the defendant for tortious interference.

Id. at 239-30.

Specifically, the plaintiff sought damages based on the defendant's profits rather than the
plaintiffs contract damages. Id. at 230.
In denying the plaintiff this relief, the Fifth Circuit observed that because the defendant
under its own agreement with the business received twice the commission that the plaintiff
would have received, the profits of the defendant materially exceeded the damages suffered by
the plaintiff. Id. at 231 (respective agreements providing that plaintiff and defendant would earn
20

Kforce, Inv. v. Surrex Solutions Corp., 436 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff precluded from
pursuing separate cases against breaching employee and interfering employer); Di Loreto v.
Shumake, 38 Cal. App. 4th 35 (Cal. App. 1995) (plaintiff precluded from pursuing emotional
distress damages for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage).
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one-half and one percent commissions). Because both damages and profits were directly
determinable by the parties' respective agreements, the Court expressly limited the plaintiffs
recovery to contract damages notwithstanding the claim's foundation in tort. Id. (citations to
Texas authorities omitted). Consequently, under the general contract theory that "the injured
party [be placed] in the same economic position it would have been in had the contract not been
breached," the Court rejected a disgorgement of the defendant's profits and limited the plaintiffs
recovery to the lost commissions specified in its own agreement. Id. (further commenting on the
argument of efficient breach and the availability of punitive damages for "particularly egregious"
conduct). However, as distinguished by Sandare, supra, the Court specifically reserved any
opinion on "whether Texas courts would permit recovery based on [a] defendant's profits where
[the] plaintiffs loss could not be directly determined." Id. at n. 5 (citing Natl. Merchandising,
348 N.E.2d 771, and the Massachusetts' court "need" in looking to the defendant's profits
"given the difficulty of determining the plaintiffs losses").
Since Marcus, Texas law has also clarified that the measure of damages for breach of
contract and tortious interference with contract may not necessarily be the same. Sulzer
Carbomedics v. Oregon Cardio-Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449, 455-56 (5th Or. 2001) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A, comment d).
hi Am. Air Filter Co., Inc. v. McNichol, the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals
also declined to apply unjust enrichment against an interfering tortfeasor under general contract
principles. 527 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975). In a suit initiated against a former employee and his
new employer, the plaintiff charged the two defendants with breach of contract and tortious
interference, respectively, for violations of a restrictive covenant in an employment contract. Id.
at 1298. Pointedly, the new employer had no knowledge of the restrictive covenant prior to its
hiring of the employee. Id. at 1299. Applying either Kentucky or Pennsylvania law, the Court
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of Appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to impose an accounting for profits on the defendant
employer. Id. at 1300.
However, in reaching this decision, the Court expressly confined its opinion to the
plaintiffs "pecuniary losses" despite noting a divergence of potential tort remedies comparable
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A.

Id. ("In this case, there are no injuries alleged

other than pecuniary losses resulting from McNichol's employment with Scanlan."). Like
Marcus, the Court determined that "ffln these circumstances [of a single employee's breach and
an employer's unknowing interference], the measure of damages for interference with
contractual relations [would] be identical to that for breach of contract." Id. (emphasis added).
Consequently, the Court reasoned:
To compel defendant to disgorge these profits could give plaintiff a windfall and
penalize the defendant, neither of which serves the purpose of contract damages.
Id. (further noting ccthat a defendant's profits are not the measure of a contract plaintiffs losses")
(emphasis added).
In Developers Three v. Nationwide Ins. Co., the Ohio Court of Appeals also declined to
adopt an unjust enrichment measure of damages in what the Court determined was a claim for
tortious interference. 582 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ohio App. 1990) ("we can best characterize
plaintiffs claim as one for tortious interference"). At issue was the plaintiffs sale of certain
options to the defendants for purchase of real estate. Id. at 1131. The plaintiff, represented by a
dissatisfied partnership interested, claimed the defendants wrongfully induced the plaintiffs
partners into breaching fiduciary duties and selling the options. Id. at 1133. In its action against
the defendants, the plaintiff explicitly disclaimed a measure of damages based upon its lost
profits or lost expectancy and argued that irrespective of amount restitution of the defendants'

Providing i4the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract" as only one of the available
damages for tortious interference.
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profits was justified. Id. at 1132. The defendants, however, challenged the appropriateness of
this remedy and argued that because the plaintiff did not have the same ability as defendants to
develop the property in question, the plaintiffs actual loss was much less than the defendant's
gain. Id.
In reaching its decision to deny the plaintiff relief, the Court of Appeals considered at
length the pros and cons of allowing an award of damages based upon a theory of unjust
enrichment. Id. at 1133-36 (citing among other authorities Natl. Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at
775-76; Fed. Sugar Refining, 268 F. at 582-83; Zippertubing, 757 F.2d at 1411-12; Am. Air
Filter, 527 F.2d at 1300). Ultimately, however, the Court held that it was "reluctant to abandon a
purely compensatory damage formula unless policy and precedent clearly supported] an unjust
enrichment theory of recovery," which the Court concluded in that particular instance did not.
Id. at 1135 ("We conclude that neither supports such a recovery in this instance.")- Specifically,
similar to Marcus, the Court reasoned that in appropriate cases, punitive damages would serve
the same function as an unjust enrichment recovery, and that precedent, such as Natl
Merchandising and Zippertubing, did not squarely confront the particular "windfall" problem
before the Court; namely, "of a plaintiff recovering the defendant's profits that [undisputedly]
exceed the plaintiffs actual loss."22 Id. Consequently, the Court decided that the "plaintiffs

Though Natl Merchandising did in fact address the flipside argument that "[n]or should a
defendant be heard to say that the unjust enrichment measure is unfairly 'punitive' because the
plaintiff may recover more than his exact loss, when use of a [conventional] tort measure might
allow the defendant to retain some part of his ill gotten gains." 348 N.E.2d at 433. And
Zippertubing did uphold a complete disgorgement of profits notwithstanding the fact that
because of outsourcing to the defendant the plaintiffs would have contracted for significantly less
lost profits. 757 F.2d at 1406; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A, comment c
(commenting that "[a] major problem with damages [resulting from interference with contract
relations] is whether they can be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty," and that "due
weight [may be given] to the fact that the question was [only] 'made hypothetical by the very
wrong' of the defendant.").
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correct measure of damages in this tortious interference action" was the plaintiffs loss and not
the defendant's gain. Id. at 1136 (emphasis added).
Since the Developers Three decision, however, the Ohio Court of Appeals has limited
this ruling and recognized that in certain circumstances, "an accounting of the tortfeasor's
profits" would be appropriate. See Try Hours, Inc. v. Swartz, 2007 Ohio 1328 (Ohio App. 2007)
(finding "support in Ohio for using an accounting of the tortfeasor's profits, gained through
misappropriation of trade secrets, breaches of fiduciary or confidential relationships, and
breaches of non-competition agreements, in calculating a business's damages"); Miller Med.
Sales, Inc. v. Worstell, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 6251 (1993) ("We do not disagree with the
contention that plaintiff would be entitled to the higher amount of either plaintiffs lost profits or
defendant's gain.").
B.

Based on the interests and circumstances of this case, TruGreen should be
permitted to recover the gains realized by Respondents for tortiously
inducing breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements and interfering with
TruGreen's economic relations.

TruGreen seeks damages incurred as a result of Respondents' inducement of massive
breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements and interference with TruGreen's economic relations.
See Amended Complaint (D. 115) atfflj126-138. At the heart of this contention is Respondents'
ability to purloin a ready-made management and sales force and within weeks create an
efficiently operated business model fashioned in the mold of TruGreen. See Statement of
Relevant Facts at ^ 9-15, 24-29, supra. As alleged, this interference has resulted in a realization
of significant revenue gains to Respondents and correspondingly diminished sales performance
by TruGreen. See id. at ^fl} 24-26; Exhibit J to Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion For
Summary Judgment (D. 178) ("Thank our reps and sales managers [i.e., former TruGreen reps
and sales managers] for not turning in a $228,000 and getting us near to the near $900,000 mark
through February!").

With respect to all Utah-related claims, the contractual covenants
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negotiated by TruGreen as protection against this very occurrence remain at issue before the
District Court, as do the overarching tort claims precipitating their mass breach. Order
Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 1. Like the above cases that affirm restitution damages,
here, the following considerations merit an affirmative response to Certified Question No. 2.
1.

The special interests of this case are comparable to other "business torts"
which permit restitution of a defendant's ill-gotten profits.

As the facts and history of this case demonstrate, an award of unjust enrichment would be
well aligned with the remedies available for similar business torts. See Natl Merchandising, 348
N.E.2d at 775 ("an approximation of the defendant's 'unjust enrichment'—often joined with an
injunction, has been a well understood feature of actions for 'business torts' such as unfair
competition (passing off) and trade name, trademark, and copyright infringement"); see also
Storage Tech., 395 F.3d at 925; Zippertubing, 757 F.2d at 1411. Under statutorily prescribed
remedies and other authorities, damages for misappropriation of trade secrets, for example, can
include both actual losses and the defendant's unjust enrichment. See e.g. Water & Entergy Sys.
Tech. v. Keil, 48 P.3d 888, 894 (Utah 2002) (relying on Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-4)23. Where
contractually defined "confidential information" is only one step removed from a "trade secret,"
see Medspring Group, Inc. v. Feng, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1279 (D. Utah 2005), there is
authority that the same damage remedy applies. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 396
(1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the agency, the agent... has a duty to
account for profits made by the sale or use of trade secrets and other confidential information"24);
see also Dubuque Prod, Inc. v. Lemco Corp., F. Supp. 108, 123 (D. Utah 1983) (with respect to

"Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriate and the unjust
enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss."
24
See also comment g, "Trade secrets and other similar private information constitute assets of
the principal. Their subsequent use by a former agent is as improper as the use of other assets,
and, whether or not the use is in competition, it is the basis for a restitutional claim . . ."
(Emphasis added).
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a business tort, a plaintiff may recover "profits retained by the defendant... by reason of the
breach of confidential information and unfair competition"). Furthermore, and important to
circumstances here, case law permits an employer to protect against and recover for the loss of a
broader range of customers than simply past and existing contacts when additional and
correspondingly broader protectable interests are at issue, including confidential information and
employee investment. See e.g. Intermountain Eye & Laser Centers, P.L.L.C v. Miller, 127 P.3d
121, 129 (Idaho 2005) ("that employers are entitled to protect themselves from competition for
their existing or past customers cannot necessarily be extrapolated to mean those are the only
customers that an employer can protect"). Accordingly, as captured in the Restatement of the
Law, Restitution § 136 (1937), when "[a] person who has tortiously used a trade name, trade
secret,franchise,profit a prendre, or similar interest of another, [he] is under a duty of restitution
for the value of the benefit thereby received." (Emphasis added).
Here, TruGreen's claim may be viewed as one for impairment of goodwill, exploitation
of confidential information and overall interference with the legitimate expectations of TruGreen
in preserving an experienced management and sales force against the predatory onslaught of a
competitor. Such interests lie close to the business torts mentioned above and would merit
application of a similar restitutionary measure for Respondent's tortious interference. See Natl
Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775.
2.

The damages resulting from Respondents' interference and inducement
of breaches of the Non-Compete Agreements are not readily
ascertainable and merit a restitutionary measure.

The fact that TruGreen may be unable to quantify with ready precision the damages
resulting from Respondents' interference and inducement of breaches of the employee NonCompete Agreements does not render TruGreen's damages illusory or insignificant. Order
Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 2 ("[T]he court believes that TruGreen has proven the fact
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of damages but that questions remain as the amount of damages"). Indeed, the difficulty of
measuring such pecuniary losses expressly formed one of the bases for TruGreen's preliminary
request for injunctive relief. See Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356
F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2004) (listing among other factors an "inability to calculate damages"
as supporting a determination of irreparable harm for preliminary injunction); Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs} Motion For Preliminary Injunction (D. 77) at 23. This
reality of circumstance is neither unique to TruGreen nor unusual of restrictive covenants in
general, as evidenced by the parties' respective contracting language and cases of this Court
which have addressed the issue:
In the event of breach or threatened breach by me of any provision of this
Agreement, the damages which TruGreen might suffer would be difficult or
impossible to measure, and therefore, TruGreen shall be entitled to an injunction.
. . Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting TruGreen from pursuing any
other remedies available to it for such breach or threatened breach including, but
not limited to, the recovery of damages from me in an amount equal to the
revenues gained by orfromthe breach.
Exhibit A5 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178)
(Non-Compete Agreement of Respondent Jim LeBlanc executed in favor of TruGreen)
(emphasis added).
In the event of a breach or threatened breach by me of any provision of the
Agreement, the damages which SLS [Scotts Lawn Service] might suffer would
be difficult or impossible to measure and, therefore, SLS shall be entitled to an
injunction . . . Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting SLS from
pursuing any other remedies available to it for such breach or threatened breach
including, but not limited to, the recovery of damages from me in an amount
equal to the revenues gained by orfromthe breach.
Exhibit B5 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178)
(Non-Compete Agreement of Respondent LeBlanc executed in favor of Respondent Mower
Bros./Scotts) (emphasis added); see also Systems Concepts, 669 P.2d at 427-28 (recognizing for
purposes of injunctive relief "irreparable injury" as "[wjrongs . . . which occasion damages that
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are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard," including misappropriation
of confidential information and goodwill).
More than creating a potential for injunctive relief, where the lost profits suffered by
TruGreen "are not readily ascertainable,"25 this Court would be justified in following the
reasoning of Sandare and Natl Merchandising and permitting a restitutionary measure of
damages for Respondents' tortious interference with TruGreen's contractual and economic
relations (Utah's past recognition of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A notwithstanding).
Sandare, 820 S.W.2d at 23-25, Natl Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 776 ("Need and reason
combine to support this avenue of recovery [under an unjust enrichment measure], because it
will often be difficult to satisfy strictly a conventional tort formula"). Unlike the circumstance of
Marcus, 797 F.2d at 229-30, the adjudicator of TruGreen's tort claims cannot look to the
interfered contracts or other written instrument for a ready measure of lost profits damages.
(Although both TruGreen and Scotts do seemingly agree that "the revenues gained by or from
the [underlying] breach[es]," supra, would be an adequate substitute). Notwithstanding that
calculating such damages in this case is expressly recognized as an "extremely difficult"
undertaking, this reality should not be construed as a continued basis for denying TruGreen relief
or adding insult to injury in favor of Respondents. June 8 Summary Judgment Order (D. 286) at
9. Indeed, due weight must be given to the consideration that the Certified Question before this
Court was only "made hypothetical by the very wrong" of Respondents and not the other way
around. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A, comment c.

25

Though the District Court presumptively concluded that TruGreen's damages are in some
degree calculable, it by no means made a determination that damages were "readily
ascertainable" in denying injunctive relief. See Order Denying Preliminary Injunction (D. 112)
at 1 (holding ;cthat injunctive relief is not warranted here because money damages [in some
form] can compensate TruGreen for any breaches."). In fact, the District Court has expressly
declared otherwise. See June 8 Summary Judgment Order (D. 286) at 9 ("The court recognizes
that calculating damages in these types of cases can be extremely difficult").
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Consistent with authorities such as Natl Merchandising and Sandare, therefore, policy
and precedent support an unjust enrichment theory of recovery in this instance.
3.

Restitutionary damages against Respondents would not create a prima
facie "windfall" in favor of TruGreen.

Although Developers Three indicated that compelling a defendant "to disgorge [its]
profits could give [a] plaintiff a windfall and penalize the defendant," 582 N.E.2d at 1134
(quoting Am. Air Filter, 527 F.2d at 1300), other courts equally consider that "a defendant
[should not] be heard to say that the unjust enrichment remedy is unfairly 'punitive' because the
plaintiff might recover more than his exact loss, when use of a [conventional] tort measure might
allow the defendant to retain some part of his ill gotten gains." Natl Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d
at 776.
What is more salient to this case, however, and equally distinguishable from cases like
Developers Three, is that an award of restitutionary damages would not create a prima facie
windfall in favor of TruGreen. Again, unlike Marcus, 797 F.2d at 231, there is no underlying
instrument to cap liability at something TruGreen "would have received" absent Respondents'
interference. And it is far from undisputed that Respondents' success is wholly attributable to
some detached source or Respondents' unique capabilities. Contrast Developers Three, 582
N.E.2d at 1132 (argument that plaintiff did not have defendants' ability to develop the property
in question). Rather, the immediate success of Respondents (at least according to regional
marketing manager Mantz) is wholly attributable to former TruGreen sales managers and
representatives now employed with Respondents. See Exhibit J to Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178) ("Thank our reps and sales managers for not
turning in a $228,000 and getting us near to the near $900,000 mark through February!").
Moreover, "once a defendant has been shown to have caused a loss, . . . the reasonable
level of certainty required to establish the amount of a loss is generally lower than that required
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to establish the fact or cause of a loss." Sampson, 770 P.2d at 1007 (quoting CookAssocs., Inc.
v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis in original). Here, TruGreen has
already established (for purposes of this certification) that Respondents have caused a loss and
consequently it is Respondents ;twho must assume the risk of some uncertainty" in fashioning an
appropriate remedy. Id. (quoting Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Utah); Order Addressing
Certification (D. 275) at 2 ("[T]he court believes that TruGreen has proven the fact of damages
but that questions remain as the amount of damages"). As the above-stated facts indicate,
TruGreen has adequately claimed a rational basis between the unprecedented gains of
Respondents and the departure of its management force and veteran sales employees. See
Statement of Relevant Facts at ^ 25-27, supra. And in applying an unjust enrichment measure
there is nothing unreasonable in taking the gross '"tainted" sales of Respondents under the
management of individuals like Mantz as TruGreen's damages. See Nat. Merchandising, 348
N.E.2d at 774-75 (damages measured as a percentage of sales26 made by defendant under the
breaching employee's managership).
4.

Given the nature of the intentional torts precipitating the respective
contract breaches, the Court should not restrict TruGreen to strictly a
"lost profits" contract measure of damages.

Especially pertinent to this case is the Natl. Merchandising puzzlement that the same
measure of lost profits damages should always apply to one who tortiously induces a breach of
contract as to one who actually commits the breach; "particularly in an aggravated case like the
present where the defendants contrive deceptively to create the opportunity for massive breaches
of contract... by a number of other persons." 348 N.E.2d at 776 n. 16. After all, at least with
respect to consequential damages, the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A is
clear:
26

Under Natl. Merchandising, there is further authority that this percentage of sales or profit
margin of the defendant tortfeasor can be based on that of the plaintiff. 348 N.E.2d at 775 n. 9.
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The action for interference with contract is one in tort and damages are not based
on the contract rules, and it is not required that the loss incurred be one within the
contemplation of the parties to the contract itself at the time it was made.
Commend d (emphasis added); see also Sampson, 770 P.2d at 1007; Colorado Interstate Gas,
661 F. Supp. at 1479 ("Damages for tortious interference are based in contract, not tort.").
Given the sheer number of departed employees and management personnel, this action is
not, suffice it to say, a case of Am. Air Filter and a single departed salesman employed in
ignorance of a restrictive covenant. 527 F.2d at 1299-1300 (restricting damages against the
unknowing employer to the same contract damages measured against the breaching employee).
And "the purpose of contract damages" heavily considered in that case becomes less relevant in
light of the fact that TruGreen never had an opportunity to contemplate in contract the size and
scope of the induced employees' mass breaches and departure. Id. at 1300.
The consciousness and scope of interference displayed by Respondents merits
recognition of a damage measure independent of the contract breaches induced. Even more so,
considering that punitive damages in this case are uniquely unavailable to "counterbalance" the
preclusion of an unjust enrichment theory. See Developers Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1135 (citing
M*rcwy, 797 F.2d at 232).
In summary to Certified Question No. 2, therefore, the counsel of Natl. Merchandising is
well taken in this case that an intending tortfeasor like Respondents should not be prompted to
speculate on profits exceeding TruGreen's losses or that alternative relief will be unavailable.
348 N.E.2d at 776; see Statement of Relevant Facts <[| 12, supra (disputed testimony regarding

Feb. 13 Summary Judgment Order (D. 253) at 43-44 (District Court's denial of punitive
damages); but see T. Leigh Anenson, Litigation Between Competitors With Mirror Restrictive
Covenants: A Formula For Prosecution, 10 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 14-17 (2005) (addressing
the hypocrisy of a defendant employer's own use of restrictive covenants in its employment
contracts as potential justification for an award of punitive damages for tortious interference);
Exhibit B5 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment (D. 178)
(mirror restrictive covenants executed by Respondents).
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Respondents' intention to sell back Scottsfranchisesat an inflated value). Based on the interests
and circumstances described above, the Utah Supreme Court should answer that TruGreen be
permitted to recover the gains realized by Respondents for tortiously inducing breaches of the
Non-Compete Agreements and interfering with TruGreen's economic relations.
II.

The Court should answer in the affirmative to Certified Question No. 1 that
Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for a former
employee's breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee nonsolicitation contract provisions.
That contract damages are generally compensatory and not restitutionary is Hornbook

law. The actualities of current contracting practices, however, have prompted modem courts to
venture beyond compensatory damages in fashioning remedies. Contracts have become more
dynamic as parties search for new ways to minimize risk. This evolution in types of contracts is
prompting a sea change in the contract theory of damages. This phenomenon has happened
before, most notably with respect to the reliance interest. The First Restatement of Contracts
recognized only three theories of damages:

expectation, benefit conferred, and specific

performance. Reliance, now recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344 and
duly accepted, was not. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in
Contract Law, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 559, 561-566 (Dec. 2006).
Although the Restatement (Second) of Contract espouses the "classical" compensatory
and expectation measure of damages, it does not preclude other measure of damages. It is the
other measures of damages (including the damages spoken of in terms of "unjust enrichment,"
"disgorgement" and "restitution") that more ably track the changes in contract law designed to
protect legitimate business interests; namely non-competition, non-disclosure and nonsolicitation agreements.
A breach of these agreements indicates that the breaching party has done exactly what it
contracted not to do. Often, as in this case, this breach is "opportunistic" or "efficient," meaning
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that "the defendant, by electing to breach, is attempting to improve on the terms of the
contractual exchange, managing either to give less or take more than the parties had agreed."
Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest," and the Restatement of
Contracts, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2021, 2021 n. 1 (June 2001). Compensatory or expectation damages
fail to acknowledge the nature of these breaches due to the difficulty of determining damages.
Any assumed or illusory restrictions against employing a restitutionary or disgorgement measure
of damages based on the breaching party's profits only exacerbates the problem. By failing to
employ a disgorgement measure of damages, the courts reward the breaching party by allowing
it to retain all benefits in excess of its damages. Why then is the disgorgement remedy not seen
more often in contract law? It is not because the Courts lack the authority to do so or contract
law forbids it. It is because "in most cases either there is no gain to be disgorged, disgorgement
is unnecessary, or disgorgement is inappropriate for special moral or policy reasons." Eisenberg,
supra, at 599. A 'Violation of [a] covenant not to compete" is a "perfect example of this form of
[opportunistic] breach" where disgorgement would be justified. Id. at 2049-2050.
Consistent with these arguments the Court should respond to Certified Question No. 1 in
favor of TruGreen. As evidenced by the parties' protracted litigation on enforceability, the
legitimate business interests which underlie these Agreements fall in line with the same interests
justifying restitution in cases of tortious interference and other "business torts." See e.g. Natl
Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775. Moreover, while many cases appear to consider only a
plaintiffs "lost profits" as the sole measure of damages for breach of a restrictive covenant,
courts have attempted to fit the proverbial square peg of "lost profits" into the round hole
occasioned by a breach of one of these non-solicitation, non-compete or non-disclosure
agreements. In so doing, they have attempted to mold the lost profits measure to fit the situation
in different ways such as recognizing a breaching party's gains as a proxy or surrogate for
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estimating these losses. Instead of attempting to shape a lost profits measure of damages to
reflect the unjust

gains of the Defendant, the Court should just recognize a

restitutionary/disgorgement measure of damages. For these reasons and the fact that the parties
mutually recognize a calculation of damages as the "revenues gained by or from" the respective
breaches, the Court should answer that disgorgement, restitution or unjust enrichment damages
are available for a former employees' breach of restrictive covenants.
A.

Some states permit restitution for breaches of non-competition or nondisclosure covenants.

Similar to the special interests justifying restitution damages for "business torts," supra,
courts in some jurisdictions recognize restitution as an appropriate remedy for breaches of noncompetition and non-disclosure covenants. Storage Tech., 395 F.3d at 925 (stating under
Minnesota law that "breach of some covenants and duties attendant on the employment relation
entitled the aggrieved employer to restitution"). Specifically, courts in these cases have held that
;c

where an employee wrongfully profits from the use of information obtained from his employer,

the measure of damages may be the employee's gain." Id. (quoting Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 9495). This assessment is in accord with existing Utah law in similar contexts which permit a
measure of damages based upon the defendant's unjust enrichment for compromised
confidential information and trade secrets, and breaches of fiduciary duties. See Water &
Entergy Sys., 48 P.3d at 894; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 94 P.3d 179, 186 (Utah
2004); see also Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 396 ("after the termination of the agency, the
agent [which would included an employee]... has a duty to account for profits made by the . . .
use of... confidential information.").
Here, breaches of the employee non-disclosure covenants and non-competition covenants
(of which protection of confidential information is a legitimate interest) remain at issue. In
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accordance with the above authorities, therefore, there is justification for the Court to allow a
restitutionary remedy for Respondents' breaches of contract.
B.

Courts often use a breaching party's gains as a proxy for calculating
damages in cases of breached non-competition agreements.

Several jurisdictions that apply the rhetoric of "lost profits" as the proper damage remedy
for breach of a non-competition contract actually use the competitor's or breaching employee's
gains as a surrogate or proxy for estimating a non-breaching party's lost profits.28 Speaking
about both damages for tortious interference and breach of a non-competition agreement, for
example, the court in KW Plastics v. United States Can Co. has stated that lost profits could be
proved through such evidence as:
(1) a comparison of the experience of the plaintiffs own business before and after
the interruption of its progress by the defendant's wrongful acts; (2) the plaintiffs
subsequent experience after the wrongful interference with the business has been
eliminated; (3) the experience of comparable businesses engaged in the same
activity; (4) the defendant's subsequent profit from enjoyment of a comparable
opportunity...
131 F.Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (D. Ala. 2001) (stating also that "[t]here is no one correct way for
proving damages") (emphasis added). This willingness to use a breaching defendant's gains as a
measure of a plaintiff s damage is evident in numerous cases which nonetheless overtly state that
the proper measure of damages is lost profits.

The rationale for using the defendant's gain is

See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 Mich. L. Rev.
559, 588 (Dec. 2006) (noting that 'there is a line of cases concerning damages where the
defendant has wrongfully competed with the plaintiff, in breach of a noncompete agreement...
[and] courts have awarded the plaintiff damages based on the defendant's profits . . . [or] the
disgorgement measure [of damages] has been used as a surrogate for the expectation measure.").
29
See e.g. Natl. Micrographics Sys., Inc. v. OCE-Indus., Inc., 465 A.2d 862, 869 (Md. 1983)
(quoting Professor Corbin, 5 Corbin, Contracts, § 1025 ("it is permissible to use the principal's
sales to estimate the agent's lost profits . . . [as] proof of the sales made and business done . . . by
the principal or his agent after the breach, may be such as to 'make possible a reasonably
accurate estimate of the commissions that the agent has been prevented from earning.'"); The
Lenco Pro, Inc. v. Guerin, 1998 Mass. App. Div. 10 (Mass. App. Div. 1998) ("the trial judge
would have been justified on the record before us, in calculating [the plaintiff]'s lost profits based
upon all the profits from all consultants placed by [defendant]."); Wirum & Cash v. Cash, 837
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that it may be difficult to measure a plaintiffs lost profits due to the breach of a non-competition
agreement and "'a more appropriate measure of damages might be that grounded5 on the
defendant's 'actual experience for the [post-breach] period rather than one based on
extrapolating profits from the results experienced' by the plaintiff in the prebreach period."
Fowler v. Printers II, Inc. 598 A.2d 794, 808 (Md. Ct. 1991) (quoting Macke Co. v. Pizza of
Gaithersburglnc, 270 A.2d 645 (Md. 1970) (emphasis in the original).
Here, as discussed, given the nature of the breaches of contract and the potentially
limitless ability to speculate on intervening causes, damages are extremely difficult to calculate.
Accordingly, a more appropriate measure of damages might be grounded on Respondents'
actual gains achieved while employed with Mower Bros./Scotts.
C.

The "liquidated damages covenants" contained in TruGreen's NonCompete Agreements operate as a contractual measure of restitution.

Even in states which seemingly prohibit restitution in non-competition cases, see e.g. Am.
Air Filter, 527 F.2d at 1299-1301, courts still uphold liquidated damages clauses that award
disgorgement of the breaching party's profits.
In Omicron Sys., Inc. v. Weiner, the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the trial court's
award of an "equitable accounting" of the defendant's gross earnings for breaches of a covenant
not to compete. 860 A.2d 554, 565-66 (Pa. Super. 2004). In that case, the defendant was found
liable for breach of a two-year restrictive covenant that prohibited the defendant from leaving the
plaintiffs employ and working for a competitor. Id. at 557. As part of the breached covenant,
the defendant agreed that the plaintiff would be entitled to injunctive relief "as well as damages
P.2d 692 712 (Alaska 1992) ("a court can consider the profit of the breaching party . . . [as] the
breaching party's profits can be a reasonable basis for estimating plaintiffs damages."); North
Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 431, 435-436 (Or. 1976) ("We agree with the trial court
that [competitor's] profits from such sales are a reasonable basis for estimating plaintiffs
damages."); Merager v. Turnbull, 99 P.2d 434, 439 (Wash. 1940) ("Those gains [to the
defendant] may be considered in awarding damages.").
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and an equitable accounting of all earnings, profits and other benefits arising from such violation
. . ." Id. at 565. Interpreting this provision as a liquidated damages clause, the appellate court
upheld the award, holding that the defendant agreed to an accounting of profits when he signed
the agreement. Id. at 565-66 (further holding that the defendant's gross income was the proper
measure).
As indicated supra, in this case, both parties have adopted similarly worded clauses to
recover "damages from [breaching employees] in an amount equal to the revenues gained by or
from the breach." See e.g. Exhibits A5 and B5 to Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion
For Summary Judgment (D. 178). Viewing these as liquidated damages clauses, such are
enforceable under Utah law as long as (i) "revenues gained" by the employee-Respondents are
reasonable forecasts of just compensation to TruGreen and (ii) actual damages are incapable or
very difficult of accurate estimation. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 858 P.2d 1363,
1366-67 (Utah 1993) ("Whether an amount [is] a reasonable forecast is determined by looking at
the contract, not at the time of its breach, but rather at the time of its formation.") (citing Robbins,
645 P.2d at 626). Where the District Court has made no finding that these covenants are
liquidated damages clauses,30 the Court should answer Certified Question No. 1 in the
affirmative that like Omicron an accounting of the Respondents' revenue gains is an appropriate
damage remedy provided the above conditions of enforceability are met. See June 8 Summary
Judgment Order (D. 286) at 9 ("The court recognizes that calculating damages in these types of
cases can be extremely difficult").

Motion Hearing Transcript (D. 271) at 63:4-5 ("Robbins v. Finlay and the liquidated damages
case that doesn't seem to me to speak to that.").
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CONCLUSION
Against the District Court's certification "that TruGreen has proven the fact of
damages"31 and for the reasons set forth herein, therefore, TruGreen respectfully requests that the
Utah Supreme Court answer in the affirmative to Certified Question No. 2 that Utah law
recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tortious interference with a
competitor's contractual and economic relations.

Notwithstanding the conventional tort

remedies described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A, restitution is not precluded as
an appropriate measure of damages and would be justified in this case of mass interference
because (1) the interests harmed by Respondents are comparable to other business torts which
permit restitution, (2) the actual losses incurred by TruGreen are not readily ascertainable, (3) an
award of Respondents' ill-gotten gains would not create a prima facie windfall in favor of
TruGreen, (4) TruGreen's claims against the interfering Respondents sound in tort, not contract,
and (5) Respondents should not be allowed to speculate that gains will exceed TruGreen's
losses.
Additionally, with respect to Certified Question No. 1, TruGreen also respectfully
requests that the Court answer in the affirmative that Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment
measure of damages for a former employee's breach of restrictive covenants. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts is silent with respect to the use of a restitutionary measure of damages as
referenced in this case. Courts have recognized that "classic" compensatory contract damages
often fail to address the harm caused by a breach of a contract designed to protect legitimate
business interests such as non-compete, non-disclosure and non-solicitation agreements.
Moreover, in recognizance of this principle, courts which on their face appear to limit a
plaintiffs recovery to "lost profits" nonetheless shape this theory to address the ill-gotten gains

Order Addressing Certification (D. 275) at 2.
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of the breaching defendant by using the breaching defendant's gains as a proxy or surrogate to
measure damages. Where the parties in this case have additionally attempted to provide for
recovery of gains realized by or through the respective breaches, the 'liquidated damages
clauses" of the Non-Compete Agreements should be conditionally accepted as a restitutionary
measure.

Q
DATED this ^

day of November, 2007.
IG&HANNI

Bman C Johnson
illiam B.Ingram
Jacob C. Briem
Attorneys for Petitioners
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(ll)(C), copies of the District Court's Order
Addressing Certification, March 6, 2007, (D. 275) and Order Certifying Questions ofLaw to the
Utah Supreme Court, June 8,2007, (D. 287) are submitted herewith.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION

TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L L C , a
Delaware limited liability company, et al,

ORDER ADDRESSING
CERTIFICATION

Plaintiffs,
V

SCOTTS LAWN SERVICE, et al,

Case No 1 06CV00024

Defendants

In an effort to provide the parties with further guidance on the certification briefs, the
court furnishes the following information The court anticipates that it will issue an order within
the next two weeks granting summary judgment to all the Idaho defendants on all remaining
claims With respect to Mower Brothers, Scotts, Greenside, Bitton, and Babilis (collectively
"Scotts Defendants"), the court believer that it will grant them summary judgment on the claims
against them that allegedly took place in Idaho Consequently, the court anticipates that the
remaining claims and defendants in this case will be as follows
1 Breach of Non-Competition Covenant Gaythvvaite and LeBlanc,
2 Breach of Confidentiality Provision Mantz, Gaythvvaite, LeBlanc, and Stephensen,
3 Breach of Non-interference Provision Mantz and Gaythwaite,
4 Interference with Contractual Relations Scotts Defendants (as to Utah claims), Mantz
and Gaythwaite,
5 Interference with Economic Relations Scotts Defendants (Utah claims),
6 Unfair Competition Scotts Defendants (Utah claims)

As a backdrop for the certification issue, the court believes that TruGreen has proven the
fact of damages but that questions remain as to the amount of damages. The court finds that it is
unclear whether Utah law would allow for an "unjust enrichment'* measure of damages on the
remaining claims. Accordingly, the court is prepared to certify to the Utah Supreme Court the
legal question(s) of whether a defendant who breaches the contract provisions and/or commits
the torts listed above can be required to account for his profits under Utah law.
The parties have been directed to provide the court with a proposed order of certification.
These "briefs" should not argue the merit of these issues but rather should focus on the
certification vehicle. The format of the Egbert v. Nissan certification order (case no. 2:04-cv551, docket no. 277) is illustrative of the type of order the court plans to issue. The parties will
have until Friday, March 16, 2007, to file their proposed orders of certification, not to exceed ten
pages in length. Any reply will be due Friday, March 23, 2007, and shall not exceed five pages
in length.
SO ORDERED.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

9J (U
Honorable Paul G. Cassell
United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION

TRUGREEN COMPANIES, L.L.C., a
Delaware limited liability company, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER CERTIFYING
QUESTIONS OF LAW TO THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT

v.
MOWER BROTHERS, INC., a Utah
corporation, et al.,
Case No. 1:06CV00024 PGC
Defendants.

The impetus for this certification is a dispute over the proper measure of damages for the
breach of an employment agreement, tortious interference with contractual and economic
relationships, and violation of Utah's Unfair Competition Act. Plaintiffs TruGreen Companies,
L.L.C., and TruGreen Limited Partnership ( t TruGreen ,, ) assert claims against four former
TruGreen employees, Ryan Mantz, Lary Gaythwaite, James LeBlanc, and David Stephensen
("employee defendants"), along with their current employer, Mower Brothers, Inc., and two
directors of Mower Brothers, Jean Babilis and Kevin Bitton. First, TruGreen alleges that the
employee defendants have breached three provisions of the TruGreen employment agreements: a
non-competition provision, a non-disclosure provision, and an employee non-solicitation
provision. Second, TruGreen asserts that Mower Brothers, Bitton, Babilis, and some of the
employee defendants tortiously interfered with TruGreen's economic and contractual

relationships Third, TruGreen alleges that Mower Brothers, Bitton, and Babihs violated Utah's
Unfair Competition Act, Utah Code Ann § 13-5a-103 Defendants deny these claims m all
respects
With regard to potential damages in this case, TruGreen asserts that an unjust enrichment
or restitution measure of damages is appropnate for all of its claims The measure of damages
under an unjust enrichment theory is generally the amount of defendant's profits

Defendants

argue that the appropnate measure of damages is lost profits, which is the amount of profit lost to
the plaintiff because of the breach, interference, or unfair competition The Court has determined
that there appears to be no controlling Utah law addressing these damages issues
Consequently, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the United
States Distnct Court for the Distnct of Utah certifies to the Utah Supreme Court these questions
of law, which are controlling in the above-captioned matter now pending before this Court
1 Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to an award of lost profits
damages, or instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages, where a former
employee has breached contractual non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee nonsolicitation provisions 9
2 Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure ot damages for tortious
interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations 9

2

3. Whether "actual damages" under Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(l)(b)(i), the Utah
Unfair Competition Act, means the plaintiffs lost profits or an award of damages defined by the
defendant's revenues?
To provide some context to the three certified questions, some brief discussion is in
order. The parties disagree over the appropriate theory of damages to be applied in this case.
TruGreen asserts that an unjust enrichment or restitution measure of damages is appropriate for
all of its claims, while the Defendants argue that the appropriate measure of damages is lost
profits. This Court will briefly address the parties' arguments as they relate to the various causes
of action to clarify the scope of the three certified questions.
I. Breach of Contract Claims
TruGreen seeks restitutionary damages against the employee defendants for their alleged
breach of the non-competition, non-disclosure, and employee non-solicitation provisions in the
employee contracts. The Defendants contend that any possible damages are limited to
TruGreen's own net lost profits proximately caused by specific breaches by each particular
defendant. The Defendants point out that the majority of state courts that have addressed this
issue appear to limit damages to the employer's lost profits or other consequential losses.' The

1

See, e.g., Am. Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975) (limiting
damages to lost profits when addressing a breach of a non-competition agreement); The Toledo
Group, Inc. v. Benton Indus., Inc., 623 N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (applying a lost
profits measure of damages to breach of non-disclosure agreement); Nationscredit Corp. v. CSSI,
The Support Group, Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1313 (Tex. App. Mar. 21, 2002) (noting that
unjust enrichment is not a proper measure of damages for breach of a non-solicitation
agreement).

3

Defendants assert that these courts have chosen to limit damages in this way by applying general
contract principles recognized in Utah - such as the principle that a non-breaching party is
entitled to recover its "expectation interest," which involves placing the non-breaching party in as
good a position as if the contract were performed.2 The Defendants also cite the Utah principle
that "a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an action for restitution as an alternative to
an action for damages where there has been a material breach of the contract by the other party."3
Additionally, Defendants argue that the Utah Supreme Court uses the terms "restitution" and
"unjust enrichment" interchangeably to describe the equitable remedy that involves restoring to a
plaintiff the benefit it provided to a party that is not subject to an express contract.4 A court's
application of such principles to the contract claims in this case, in the view of the Defendants,
strongly supports a lost profits theory of recovery.
TruGreen responds that it is not limited to recovering its lost profits but also any unjust
enrichment by the Defendants. TruGreen first notes the difficulty of using a lost profits measure
of damages in breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-interference cases. In System
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, the Utah Supreme Court held that injunctive relief may be an
appropriate remedy for the breach of a non-competition agreement given that "the damages that
may result from the misappropriation of confidential information and goodwill could be

2

See, e.g., Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982).

3

Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979).

"See Am. Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182, 1192-93 (Utah 1996).

4

estimated only by conjecture and not by any accurate standard.",:) TruGreen then notes that the
Utah Supreme Court has generally acknowledged that an injured employer may also maintain a
claim for damages in addition to seeking injunctive relief.6 Furthermore, the Utah Supreme
Court has shown a willingness to honor liquidated damage provisions in a non-competition
agreement, provided the liquidated amount is reasonable, given that "[tjhere is no doubt that the
harm caused by the breach was one that was difficult to estimate with much accuracy."7
In addition to the difficulty of using a lost profits measure of damages for breach of noncompetition cases, TruGreen also recounts the deterrent effect of applying an unjust enrichment
theory of damages. In National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that an employee who breached a non-competition agreement and the competitor who
induced the breach were liable to account for their gains associated with the breach.8 Leyden
noted that "an intending tortfeasor should not be prompted to speculate that his profits might
exceed the injured party's losses, thus encouraging commission of the tort."9 According to
TaiGreen, the deterrent effect resulting from restitutionary damages, coupled with the difficulty
of using a lost profits measure in breach of non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-

5

669 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1983) (quoting Columbia Coll. oj Music & Sch. ojDramatic
Artv. Thunberg, 116 P. 280, 282 (Wash. 1911).
6

See Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Dixon, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992).

7

Robbins, 45 P.2d at 626.

8

348N.E.2d771 (Mass. 1976).

9

M a t 775-76.
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interferences cases, are more than sufficient grounds to support restitutionary damages for the
contractual provisions at issue m this case
While both parties strongly argue their respective positions, they both concede that no
Utah court has expressly determined the proper measure of damages for breach of these specific
contract provisions Consequently, this Court respectfully asks the Utah Supreme Court to
answer the first certified question
2 Tortious Interference with Economic and Contractual Relations
The second certified question is whether Utah recognizes an unjust enrichment measure
of damages for tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations
Both parties acknowledge that the Utah Court of Appeals has generally adopted Section 774A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the measure of damages for tortious interference with
contract Section 774A provides that
(1) One who is liable to another for interference with a contract or prospective
contractual relation is liable for damages for
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective
relation
(b) consequential losses for which the interference is a legal cause, and
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, it they are reasonably to
be expected to result from the interference l0
Despite their respective reliance on Section 774A, the parties disagree regarding the effect of the
Utah Court of Appeal's adoption of this section

10

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979)

6

The Defendants argue that Sampson v. Richins is fully instructive on this issue.11 In
Sampson, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed cross-appeals on the amount of damages awarded
to defendants for Sampson's intentional interference with defendants' economic relations.12
Sampson upheld the trial court's damages award pursuant to Section 774A, noting that "one who
is ultimately deemed liable to another for interference with economic relations is liable for 'the
pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective relation; [or] consequential losses
for which the interference is a legal cause . . . ."13 Applying Section 774A, Sampson held that the
trial court's findings regarding damages "must identify actual pecuniary losses suffered by
[plaintiff] as a result of [defendant's conduct."14 In addition to their reliance on Sampson,
Defendants point to numerous courts outside of Utah that recognize that plaintiffs lost profits,
and not restitution of defendant's revenues, are the proper measure of damages for tortious
interference.15
Although TruGreen concedes that the Utah Court of Appeals has generally adopted
Section 774A, it maintains that such an adoption nevertheless allows for the application of unjust

11

770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

12

Id. at 999-1002.

13

Id. at 1006-07 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A (1979)).

14

Id.

15

See, e.g., Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't Sees., Inc. v. Jefferson Inv. Corp., 797 F.2d
227, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding under Texas law that damages for tortious interference are
measured by plaintiffs lost profits).

7

enrichment damages in some tortious interference cases. First, TruGreen cites comment c of
Section 774A, where the commentators note that "[a] major problem with damages of this sort is
whether they can be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty."16 Second, TruGreen argues
that the fact Utah courts have adopted Section 774A merely supports the idea that the measure of
damages in tortious interference cases must mirror the measure of damages for the underlying
breach. In Storage Technology Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Eighth Circuit cited Section
774A but subsequently found that under Minnesota law, "[a]n employee who breaches a
noncompetition or nondisclosure covenant can be required to account for his profits."17 The
court reasoned that "where the interference alleged is inducement of breach of restrictive
covenants or fiduciary duties, the remedy should mirror the restitutionary remedy available for
the breach of the covenant or fiduciary duty."18 Also, as was discussed above, TruGreen
contends that a lost profit measure of damages would encourage competitors and employees to
speculate that their gains will outweigh losses and thereby encourage the breach of valid and
enforceable covenants.19
As far as the Court and the parties can assess, no Utah court has directly addressed the
measure of damages where former employees and a competitor tortiously interfere in the context

16

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774A cmt. c (1979).

17

395 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2005).

18

Id.

19

See Natl Merch. Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976).

8

of an employment contract containing non-competition, non-disclosure, and non-interference
provisions. To determine whether Utah recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for
tortious interference with a competitor's contractual and economic relations, this Court
respectfully requests the Utah Supreme Court to answer the second certified question.
3. Unfair Competition
TruGreen has asserted a claim under Utah's Unfair Competition Act, which limits
recovery to "actual damages."20 The parties differ over whether this phrases extends to lost
profits or an award of damages defined by the defendant's revenues. It appears that no Utah
court has interpreted the meaning of "actual damages" under this statute. Consequently, this
Court respectfully aks that the Utah Supreme Court answer the third certified question.
CONCLUSION
The Court has concluded that there is no controlling case law addressing the three
questions of law discussed above. Because these questions of law are controlling in this case,
this Court certifies these questions to your Court. The clerk of this Court shall transmit a copy of
this Order of Certification to counsel for all parties to the proceedings in this Court. The clerk
shall also submit to the Utah Supreme Court a certified copy of this Order and any other portion
of the record before this Court that may be required by the Utah Supreme Court. Under Rule
41(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court orders that each party shall bear its
own fees and costs of this certification.

20

Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(l)(b)(i).
9

SO ORDERED.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Paul G. Cassell
United States District Judge
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ADDENDUM NUMBER 2 TO OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONERS

Motion Hearing Transcript, February 28,2007
Before the Honorable Paul G. Cassell,
UnitedStates District Court,
in and for the District of Utah
l:06-cv-24PGC

^APPEUJ^
I ) J v*<-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION
In re:
TRUGREEN COMPANIES, a
Delaware Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:06-CV-00024

vs.
KEVIN D. BITTON, et al.,
Defendants.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAUL G. CASSELL
February 28, 2007
Motion Hearing

Laura W. Robinson, CSR, RPR, CP
350 South Main Street
144 U.S. Courthouse
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2180
{801)328-4800

1

Appearances of Counsel:
For the Plaintiffs:

Brian C* Johnson
Heather E. Waite-Grover
William B. Ingram
Attorneys at Law
STRONG & HANNI
3 Triad Center
Suite 500
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THE COURT: We're here this morning on the case of
TruGreen versus Bitton, et al. Nice to see Mr. Johnson and
his team again.
MR, JOHNSON:

Thank you.

THE COURT: That is Mr. Ingram and Ms. Waite-Grover;
is that right?
MR. JOHNSON: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. And let's see, Mr. Gibb and
his team. Nice to see you again.
MR* GIBB: Good to see you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: We have got Mr. Olson, Mr. Hymas and
Mr. Hull; is that right?
MR. GIBB: Yes, Your Honor•
THE COURT: All right. Well, we're here today, as I
understand it, we had some earlier rulings and then the
question is what is sort of the fall out from those earlier
rulings particularly whether the fact that Mr. Elggren, the
plaintiff's expert, has been excluded, whether that leaves
us anything left to try.
I put together a tentative order thinking that, which
outlines my tentative view on this.

I will emphasize today

that I am tentative on this. That with Elggren out, there
isn't enough solid evidence about damages to move forward
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and that we wouldn't —

nominal damages, I'm still working

through the case law, but the law really would be somewhat
mixed up if we could spend hundreds of thousands of dollars
in attorney's fees to figure out who gets a dollar in
damages.

At least that is what I'm thinking now.

If I'm overlooking something, I'm sure that
Mr. Johnson and his able team will let me know.

So why

don't I hear from you, Mr. Johnson, on all of these issues.
MR. JOHNSON:
in the underworld*

This may be a little bit like Sisyphus
Having read your tentative ruling, Your

Honor, I'm not sure, even though I think sometimes in a
moment of arrogance I have some skill I'm going to have much
success, but I will say a few things.
Historically, a breach of these kinds of covenants
non-compete, non-solicitation, non-interference,
non-disclosure of confidential information have been
appropriate vehicles for injunctive relief.

Why?

For the

very reason we have come, I think, to this juncture.

The

damages are, as the case law says and we cited ad nauseam,
you have read them, they are notoriously difficult to prove.
It doesn't mean though that the injury to goodwill
that is sustained by somebody who is subjected to a breach,
the injury to fair competition that occurs when these kind
of covenants are breached, the harm to a party caused by the
exploitation of its investment in the training of an
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individual is not real.

It means that perhaps injunctive

relief is more appropriate-

Well we crossed that bridge

back at the end of July when this court said well,
preliminarily, so the court did change its mind.
Preliminarily I suspect that you could show damages. Urn, it
seems just as an initial observation sort of unfair for the
defendants to breach with impunity these agreements. And I
guess I still remain reasonably persuaded, Your Honor, that
any jury that looked at this evidence, particularly with
respect to the five Idaho defendants, conclude they breached
these agreements. Are able to do that with impunity when
those agreements were bargained for at arms length. We seem
to be now sort of lost perhaps, perhaps I'm the one that is
lost, not the court, not Mr. Gibb and his team, in
conflating the fact of damages with the amount of damages.
It is going to be real hard for us to calculate with
specificity an amount of damages. But I would suggest to
you that a simple walk through of about three exhibits that
are the defendants1 exhibits are going to show you the fact
of damages. That would be one that nobody is seriously
going to contest, at least I111 be surprised if they do,
that the named nine defendants that remain had no expertise
in the lawn care sales industry until they went to work for
TruGreen.
Number two, that there was no intervening employment
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on those individuals' behalf when they left TruGreen and
went to work for Scotts Mower Brothers.
Number three, that in 2005, TruGreenrs performance was
markedly better than it was in 2006, and that in 2006 Mower
Brothers• performance was markedly better than it was in
2005.

What was the causal link between that and the

departure of the defendants?

Well, I could bring in fancy

charts, which I have but I won't, that show that those nine
defendants', Exhibit 20 to Mr. Rasmussen's expert report,
resulted in 95 percent of the revenue gain that was
experienced by Mower Brothers Scotts.
Is any juror going to conclude, faced with that
evidence, that well, that is just a statistical aberration?
I don't think so.

I don't think -- maybe we're in a

situation where we have now in a context given every
inference and their brief fact controversy we have given the
nod to the defendants.
THE COURT:

Why don't you just walk me through what

you just did a little bit more, this notion that 95 percent
of the revenue and so forth.

I mean that sounds like the

kind of thing that, you know, would support a
MR. JOHNSON:

—

For Mr. Rasmussen's and I apologize, I

am sure that the defendants have these documents because
they're attached as a report.
THE COURT:

Have they had a chance to look at it?
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MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

This i§ their own documents.
They are squinting across the room here.

Why don't you just show them what they are.

I'm sure they

can fish them out.
MR. JOHNSON:

We can give them copies.

Your Honor a copy, too, if you would prefer.
you have an extra copy?
THE CLERK:

I can give
Heather, do

Thank you.

Do you want me to get the easel for that.

MR. JOHNSON:

I'll just hold it.

That is okay.

In

Salt Lake in 2006.
THE COURT:
you're on.

Let me make sure I'm on the same page

Are you on Exhibit 20.1; is that right?

MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Right.

Okay.

MR. JOHNSON:

Here are the figures that Mr. Rasmussen

reports in his expert report.

You see that the single

largest producer of revenue in that office was James
LeBlanc, $374,705.

That is a former TruGreen employee.

Most everybody else is no where near that amount.
THE COURT:

Well, I'm —

so let's see, which employee

is that, again?
MR. JOHNSON:
side, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
here.

Jim LeBlanc on the upper right hand
One of the named defendants.
Is this — maybe I'm on the wrong page

I have got sales by program sold Boise.
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MR. JOHNSON:
Honor.

Let mef go to Boise first then, Your

That is easy.

Boise, for 2006 and Mower Brothers,

the big producers were David Van Acker, 185,000; James
Clogston, 194,000; Rick Deerfield, 120,000; and I'm not very
good at math, that has got to be five or 600,000 out of 777.
So my hyperbole got away from me.

But they clearly produced

the lion's share of revenue in Boise.

I don't think there

is a material dispute on that.
If we look at Ogden,. again the lion's share of the
revenue, or the biggest single producer at any rate is
Mr. Stephensen produced $280,000 out of what .is about
457,000, I believe.

In Salt Lake, out of 370, excuse me,

that is incorrect, out of about a million three, LeBlanc
produced close to 400,000.

And everybody else is in the

much smaller range.
Now, Mr. Rasmussen's expert report attributes the
growth that undeniably occurred in Scotts to what?
things.

To two

Increased direct sales, and this is in his

deposition, increased direct sales opportunities for those
individuals.

That just defies statistical probability that

those guys could get that many more direct sales
opportunities.
that is going

I would submit that that is an inference
to be drawn in anybody's favor it ought to be

drawn in ours.
Number two he says well, it is the nine employee
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defendants that is betrayed by these very exhibits.

And it

is also betrayed by Mr. Mantz's e-mail when he says listen,
our direct mail is down.

The reason we're having a hell of

a year, pardon my profanity, is what?

Is because we have

got these new sales people from Scotts.
TruGreen.

Is that enough?

I mean from

Well, I think it is enough to

get it to a jury.
And I think, you know, the idea that well maybe there
was a weather consideration, none of these things, of
course, are advertising issues.

None of those things are

analyzed in any detail, if .at all, by Mr. Rasmussen and
certainly the people on the ground.

That is like suggesting

to say that Mr. Smith or Mr. Horlacher, or any one of the
number of people from TruGreen, aren't competent to testify
and haven't already in their depositions testified about
this stuff or in their affidavits, is like saying that
somebody has a better feel for what is going on in Iraq
sitting in Washington D.C. than some general on the ground.
They are going to know better than Mr. Rasmussen whether
weather effects their performance or not.

In fact, I think

that was repudiated, if I'm not mistaken, by a number and I
would have to go to a page, I'm out of order in my argument,
Your Honor, but I'm reasonably sure that I can cite you to
pages where they actually considered that and discounted
that.
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So, yeah, damages are very difficult to prove in these
cases.. And particularly in those non-painting a barn kind
of contracts where you have interest like fair competition
and injury of goodwill.

But I don't think that the fact

that we can't specify an amount at this kind of obvious
evidence precludes us from going to trial on that issue.
We're going to offer at trial, we would offer, Nick Smith,
who has testified in his affidavit as to, you know, and
maybe the court's concern is well is there a causation, is
there —

yes, clearly these people are great sales people

and they went over and this gets to the measure of damages,
they went over and they generated similar revenue which we
now clearly lo.st, you have seen the numbers, they're now
generating that revenue for Mower Brothers not for TruGreen.
But is that enough in the court's mind or does the court
instead want to say listen unless we can show a real
specific, that is, that they purloined customers from
TruGreen to Mower Brothers, that is not enough-

In fact,

they may be gifted sales people.
"Well, I would submit one that is a question for a
jury.

Two, I think it is betrayed by the evidence we have

shown you.

And three, I think although defendants

consistently maintain well, while Utah doesn't allow a
restitutionary measure, that is because Utah hasn't really
considered it.

And in fact in one case in Idaho, as I
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recall, I believe that the Dunn versus Ward case in a
non-competition agreement that did involve admittedly a sale
of a business that they did use that measure of damages.
Why?

Because they are notoriously difficulty to measure.

And we have a protectable interest in not only in our
existing customers, but I think we have a protectable
interest in the universe of customers that are in the
geographic areas that we protected ourself. And I think
that is borne out in case law which we have cited in our
briefs.
THE COURT:

So what is your damages measure?

I, you know, is it restitution?

Is it lost profits?

I mean
I mean

what —
MR. JOHNSON: Well, it is lost profits.

I guess we're

limited to the 2,477 customers that defected, that even
Rasmussen admits, from TruGreen —
Brothers.

from TruGreen to Mower

If it is what I think is much more appropriate a

restitutionary measure, it is their gain. And I believe
that cases that have —• jurisdictions that have considered
the issue have concluded, and I'm going to quote from the
American Express case, the loss of fair competition which
results from breach of contract of a covenant not to compete
is irreparable injury because damages are difficult to -difficult to compute.

In that case, they use the

restitutionary measure precisely for that reason. What
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would that be in this case?

I think the gain to Mower

Brothers which can be shown through their own documents and
through their own expert, Mr. Rasmussen.
Frankly, I do not —

I guess the court on a separate

note having not, you know, I understand the court's initial
reaction to what nominal damages am I really vindicating any
kind of right here if as the court has concluded these are
really fact specific inquiries.
specific inquiry.

You know, this is a fact

There is no over-arching declaratory

relief I'm granting the plaintiff in this case because every
one of these covenants not to compete enforceability turns
on the individual defendant involved,
court's predisposition
THE COURT:

—

Geographic area --

MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

I think that is the

Again, I understand that.

All of that.

MR. JOHNSON:

I would say that with respect to at

least the five Idaho defendants where I don't think there is
any kind of issue that we have a —
enforcement as against them.

we have an interest of

If for no other reason that it

is going to have a prophylactic or chilling effect on
activity that otherwise is going to be really encouraged by
the opinion in this case, you know, we're not going to -we're not going to be able to look any employee in the eye
and say these things are easily enforceable because we're
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not going to get injunctive relief in this district court
and it is difficult although perhaps a better lawyer could
have more brilliantly proven damages, I'm suggesting that it
is a very difficult task.

And to get a judgment for nominal

damages, if that, if the court is not persuaded to use these
numbers and give us restitutionary relief, to give us
declaratory essentially relief for nominal damages against
those five and perhaps at least the other two which I think
we could have gotten on summary judgment in Utah and go to
trial on the remaining two in Utah, that is —

that is a

tremendous value to TruGreen in dealing with a large work
force.
And the flip of that is going to be, you know, we're
in a situation where instead what is going to happen is I
think people will now think they can breach these contracts
with relative impunity and it certainly has a deterrent
effect in so far as at least the five in Idaho and the four
in Utah are concerned if not a more inchoate deterrent
effect akin to the one that would result from enforcing
capital punishment on a more regular basis.
metaphor, Your Honorf

Pardon that

but I think it is true.

We would like that vindicated in this case.

And I

believe that the case law is relatively clear, particularly
the Utah case of Internal Management which is pretty much on
all fours with this case.

It is a non-compete case where
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there was an issue about causation and we couldn't, in that
case, there was an inability to show diverted customers
which is I think the lost profits theory the defendants rely
on.

The court none the less granted nominal damages in that

case and vindicated that interest at least in so far as
those defendants are concerned.
I am sympathetic to the idea that a lot of money gets
spent litigating the -case when there is no real damage.

But

in my defense, that is why I moved for injunctive relief in
the first instance, Your Honor,

And I think fairness may,

under this circumstance, where it looks to me like every
inference, every disputed fact has been resolved in favor of
the defendants maybe we ought to look at it in another way.
I don't think there is any difficulty at all.

You know, I

would love to be able to argue, I don't want to waste your
time, the Wayne Elggren issue with you.

Because I think

that maybe we got the raw end of the deal, Your Honor, to be
frank.

But I don't want to consume needlessly this court's

time because I'm -THE COURT:
my

I'll hear you on that briefly.

I mean

—
MR, JOHNSON:

Okay,

Well, if I'm -- I would -- I will

step down and just let Heather argue that, she knows it
better than I do.

But I do think that in spite of the fact

that even without Wayne, I think that Heather will explain

14

the math better, but without Wayne, the amount of damages
may be more difficult to prove. But the fact of damages is
not difficult to prove certainly based on those exhibits and
based on Mr. Rasmussen's own math which tracks Mr- Elggren's
math.

And what Mr. Smith and others from TruGreen will do

is simply testify I'm on the ground with the guys in Iraq.
I know that weather makes no difference. And the court says
well why didn't you do this in your summary judgment papers?
Well, primarily because we were interested in the result on
liability, Your Honor. The evidence is in the record, and
it is in the briefs. And with that, I'd like Heather to
address the Wayne Elggren issue.
THE COURT:

I'll be glad to hear from her in a second,

but I have a couple more questions for you.
MR. JOHNSON: Fine.
THE COURT: One problem I'm having, I'm trying to get
my hands around this, is I'm not completely clear on what
your damages theory is. I think you have spelled it out a
little bit. But once I get a handle on that, it might be
helpful for me to see you layout, you know, the defendants
are saying look you're telling us what you have got a
foundation for, but you're not telling us specifically what
the evidence is. And it might be helpful to say okay we're
going to call Smith and he is going to say this and we are
going to use this, defendants you know financial report Y

15

here and

—

MR. JOHNSON;

Okay,

What I would say

as to that, Your

Honor, beyond that simple exercise that I just showed you,
which I think is sufficient to get me to a jury, what I
would do at trial is call Mitch Smith and Mr. Gershkoff to
establish that the employed defendants were exposed to
information while they conclude, "and that is all they do is
conclude, they don't deny they ever received it, they just
conclude it was not confidential, that they were exposed
essentially or attended the training that is identified in
Exhibit K.

That they were involved, that is Mr. Smith and

Mr, Gershkoff as well as many of the management defendants
that defected in the past and future performance analysis of
TruGreen, that is the day-to-day revenue stuff that comes up
with the flash reports, the cancellation numbers, the
performance of each individual person.

And that there is --

I would have in Horlacher's deposition already, I believe,
but they would testify that there is a causal connection
between their departure, that is the employee defendant's
departure, the nine that remain, and the lost revenue to
TruGreen,

That is Exhibit 93 which these guys, if granted,

have moved to strike,
THE COURT:
trouble.

Now let me -- this is where I am having

How4 can they say that there is a causal

relationship?

The nine —

the employees that left, could
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have left it is, you know, employment at will.
MR* JOHNSON:

Sure. But had they left and not worked

for them, we wouldn't be here. They went to work for a
competitor in contravention of their agreement.
THE COURT: But the point is that what I would have to
hear from is the fact that they went to work for a
competitor now created the loss, right? Just the fact that
somebody leaves does not create damages you can recover for.
What you have got to show is one more bit of information.
They went over to -MR. JOHNSON:

I guess I would disagree with the court

on that. I understand that is the real technical lost
profit theory. But if there is all these other inchoate
interests that we can protect which cases that have dealt
with these things identify, that is the loss of goodwill
which is what is measured by gross revenue. The loss of the
protection for a fair competition which we have bargained
for in these agreements.

I don't think we have to show

anything other than their services now. I mean I grant you
there is a 13th Amendment that prohibits involuntary
servitude, but they have taken those skilled in that
expertise and gone somewhere else. And that has damaged us.
That has damaged us. And anybody that looks at the revenue
they produced for our competitor and understands that they
honored their employment agreements, they would either not
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be working for —

they certainly would not working for the

competitor and they might be working for us, understands
that that revenue at least is more assessable to us because
it is not of the defendants and in some cases would be ours
if they had honored their agreement and stayed in our
employ,

I understand the difficulty that the court has with

this, but that —

that is why these things —

step off comparing parenthetically,

let me just

I would have been more

comfortable, and I have to be careful because I don't want
to sound like a complainer or a whiner, if early on in this
case we would have said, you know, counsel, I just have
problems with the public policy underlying these agreements.
I am not sure they're enforceable because they tend to
retard or restrain competition, but that is really not the
road that we embarked on.
culpa, mea maxima culpa.

And, you know, mia culpa, mia
I made some errors in this case

I'm sure.
THE COURT:

I may have led you down the wrong path

because when I ruled on the injunctive relief I thought you
all were going to prevail when we got later on.
MR. JOHNSON:

I don f t think we have fallen down on the

liability issue much.

At best we're going to trial.

I do

think on a number of these defendants maybe that was just an
abundance of caution on the court's part.

I don't think we

should be hamstrung because all that we can show, and I used
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all in quotes, is that people that worked for us are now the
humongous producers for the defendant and the defendant's
own witnesses, their own expert and their own sales manager/
at least the testimony of their sales manager Ryan Mantz
said the reason we're doing so well is because these people
have come over.

The court's question seems to be well how

do you tie that to their departure from you?

And what I

have said to you is we have a lot of more, like I say,
inchoate interests that we can protect that those cases
identify.

And goodwill which translates into lost revenues

is one of those.

That is why a restitutionary measure in

these cases, I think, is more appropriate.
THE COURT:

If they had gone to Hawaii, which is let's

stipulate not a competitor with your clients here in Utah,
the fact that they left wouldn't entitle you to anything?
MR. JOHNSON:

No, you're right.

But I also would not

have a chart that showed them generating that kind of
revenue from my competitor.

That revenue would still be in

play, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Suppose they had gone to Hawaii and, you

know, Stephensen generated $280,000 in profits for the
Hawaiian Lawn Mower Company.
MR. JOHNSON:

They are not in the universe of

customers that I'm entitled to protect geographically.
THE COURT:

Now what I think that maybe my
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hypothetical is getting at, they're not in Hawaii, they're
closer by, but you have got to show that it is not like
Hawaii. That they're actually, you know, stealing people
away and dollars away from your —

from your company.

MR* JOHNSON: Well, I think, as I said, I think the
conclusion is, in some respects, is inescapable. When you
see that on day one in 2005 being day one, we have a very
good year, these people work for us and we have a lot of
revenue. On-day two, this is 2006, they don't work for us.
We don't have the same revenue and suddenly Mower Brothers
has the revenue. Not only that, the revenue is attributable
to those people who used to work for us. And not only that,
their own sales manager says the reason we're doing so well
is these people work for us. Not only that, the owner of
the business says the reason we hired these people, is why?
Because we needed their marketing expertise.
Not only that, we know that the only marketing
expertise they ever got was when they went to work for us
because they had none beforehand.

That is unambiguously

agreed in everybody's deposition, and it is also
unambiguously agreed that nobody worked any place else after
they left us and went to work for them.
enough.
says

I think that is

If I'm on a jury, I'm buying that unless the judge

I'm not going to let you get it, which is essentially

what has happened here.
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THE COURT:
Smith.

Let me ask you another question about

I have just had a quick chance to go over this

morning your motion on, you know, the Exhibit 93.
you're planning to call Smith.

And

But it seemed to me you're

planning to call Smith as an expert witness.

My question

is, was he disclosed as an expert witness and, you know,
that is why we have reports and the whole sort of expert
witness apparatus.
MR. JOHNSON:

He was disclosed as an expert witness

and to be fair to the defendants, if I'm not mistaken, Mark,
you have moved to similarly to Mr. Elggren to strike him as
an expert, didn't you?
MR. GIBB:

That is correct,

MR. JOHNSON:

I don't know that it has ever been

disposed of by this court.
THE COURT:

So I mean one

MR. JOHNSON:

—

He was identified as an expert and

summary of what he intended to testify was provided.
THE COURT:

Was the summary the same thing that I am

seeing here?
MR, JOHNSON:

No, not at all.

about acquisitions, I believe.

His testimony was to be

I would have to go get -• I

hate not to be so conversant with every fact in this case,
Your Honor, but I'm pretty sure that his testimony was to be
limited until we decided to try to use him under 701 to
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acquisition prices.
THE COURT:

But the -- it seemed to me your pleading

that just came in this morning is going to try to use him as
a 702 expert witnesses on damage calculations and that that
would not be permissible based on what I know about the case
because there is no report and no depositions.
MR. JOHNSON:

I would stipulate that if he is being

treated as an expert under 702, that is a right read and
that is something that if we're going to talk about, if I
might defer to Mr. Ingram because he handled that part of
this case.
THE COURT:

Maybe I should hear first from

Ms. Waite-Grover on the Elggren issue and then Mr. Ingram on
the Smith issue.
MR. JOHNSON:

That would be helpful.

MS. WAITE-GROVER:

Your Honor, TruGreen argued in its

motion to reconsider, we believe that the court has erred in
both of its reasons for excluding Mr. Elggren's testimony.
The first reason as we understand it from the court's
order for excluding Mr. Elggren's testimony as unreliable
was that the idea that his methodology assumed -methodology assumed the conclusion.

And in so saying the

court pointed out its contention that TruGreen had not
explained how Scott's gains are a result of TruGreen's
employees1 actions or breaches.

And that also Mr. Elggren's
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methodology assumes the conclusion.
We would like to first point out that the issue of
causation is a separate issue.

And that Mr. Elggren, as our

damage expert, assumed causation.
law entitles him to do so.

We believe that the case

While it may be advantageous to

a party to have their damage experts speak both to causation
as well to the damages, the fact of damage and the amount of
damage Mr. Elggren is nonetheless entitled to limit his
testimony simply to an analysis of the numbers which is the
amount of damages.
Doing so does not make it fatal to the reliability.
The fact that he assumed causation simply means that at
trial, in the event that it is not ultimately proved, this
court would have less weight or less credibility with the
jury.

Thus

—

THE COURT:
—

Well, what do you assume though?

I think

I think in theory that is correct, but I'm wondering how

that works in practice.

It is sort of like saying well,

okay, I'm going to assume causation.

I'm going to assume

that 30 percent of the revenues, you know, that Scotts got
was stolen away and now let me do the math ah-ha 30 percent
is, you know, $3 million or something.

I mean isn't the key

question in this case has always been what percent of the
revenues were stolen away from Scott and handed over to
TruGreen,

And that is what I thought Elggren was trying to
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get at.
MS, WAITE-GROVER:

And he was doing that.

He came up

with a figure of 30 percent of retention that he believes
was attributable to the methods adopted by Scotts after the
arrival of the TruGreen employees.

Specifically, one of

those methods was -- was to cancel the call-in practice that
Scotts adopted prior to the TruGreen employees coming over.
Essentially a practice whereby the Scotts' employees would
call the customer prior to actually performing the service.
If you would like me to walk through 'the math on that, I
have prepared a chart that I think is a little bit more
simply explains it.
THE COURT:

I'll be glad to look at that.

MS. WAITE-GROVER:

First, I will point out that there

was two pieces of evidence in the record that Mr. Elggren
used to come up with the 30 percent figure.

Number one, was

financial data submitted by Scotts; and then the second was
an analysis of the trends at Scotts as evidenced by
Mr. Mantz's March 2006 e-mail.

And those are the two

documents from which Mr. Elggren formed a basis for his
30 percent figure.
He noted based on Ronny Mantz's e-mail, that Scott's
had had a past record of having 50 percent of their
customers at risk at every phone call.

Meaning every time

they called a customer before performing a service, they had

24

a chance that half of the customers were going to say no
thanks, I'm done.

He noticed that Mr. Mantz also pointed

out in these e-mails that in 2005, 53 percent of the
customers at Scotts were signed up on this call ahead
program.
So if you look at rows A, B and C of the chart that I
just handed you, that shows that of the 53 percent of
Scotts* customers that were signed up for the program, half
of those were at risk of cancellation every time a phone
call was made.

Which means an overall 27 percent of the

customers at Scotts were cancelling based on this call ahead
program.
Then if you look at row D, E and F, you will look at
the numbers for 2006.

As reported in Ryan Mantz's e-mail,

in 2006, they had managed to change it so that only eight
percent of their customers were signed up at the call ahead
program.

So if that 50 percent risk factor is still there,

that means that of those eight percent signed up on the
program, only four percent would ultimately cancel.
So if you look at Row G, and you are comparing the
cancellation rate from 2005 and 2006 associated with this
call ahead practice, you come out with a net savings of 23
percent of your customers.
cancelled.

Whereas in 2005, 27 percent

In 2006, only four percent cancelled.

That

drops the cancellation rate 23 percent.
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Then Mr. Elggren went and looked at Scotts' financial
records that have been produced for 2005 and he found out
that the total revenue that Scotts earned in 2005 was a
little over two million dollars. 23 percent of that
$2,000,000 is that $489,000 figure that you see in Row I.
When Mr. Elggren went and looked at the 2006 revenue from
Scotts* financial data, he determined that the revenue
attributable to customers carried over from 2005 was
$1.6 million. And then he compared the amount of that
revenue on line I with line J.

He basically divided the

customer revenue that was saved by dropping the call ahead
procedures, the $489,000 figure, by the overall 2006 revenue
from the 2005 customers and he found out that 489,000 is 30
percent of 1.6 million.
So this is how Mr. Elggren came to determine that at
least one practice adopted by Scotts after the arrival of
TruGreen people, and I believe at the behest of Mr. Mantz,
saved the company approximately 30 percent of its revenue
from pre-existing customers, customers that existed in 2005,
THE COURT: You started out by telling me that he was
entitled to assume causation.

So I guess I don't have a

problem with him saying look, I'm going to assume that
3 0 percent of this was stolen away from Scotts and if you do
the math it turns out to be $500,000 or whatever. But your
side of the case still has to put into evidence somewhere
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something saying and that 30 percent is reliable Daubert
satisfying statistically valid conclusion.

Arid if Elggren

isn't going to do it, who is going to do that for me?
MS. WAITE-GROVER:

The math that I just went through

right here is Mr. Elggren1s method for arriving at the
30 percent figure and for concluding that 30 percent is a
legitimate number.

I don't think that there is anything

radical about the addition, subtraction and multiplication
that I just walked you through there that Mr. Elggren used.
I mean that is his accounting method for assessing
30 percent.

And I guess I fail to see how that is

unreliable or some sort of radical or new or untested method
for doing math.
THE COURT:
30 percent?

Well, the math is all right, but why

I mean you could plug in 40 percent and you

could get more money or the defense could say, well, make it
20 percent.

Who is going to say 30 percent is the right,

you know, that this is all safe because of the new Mantz
procedures.

Is Elggren going to say this 30 percent all

stems from the new Mantz procedures and therefore that is
the causation link?
Maybe my question is not very clear.
Because you started off by —
again.

I'm sorry.

let me run at that this way

You started off by telling me he is just the math

guy, he is just calculating damages, he is entitled to
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assume causation.

I agree with you.

assuming causation, what —

But then if he is

which witness at the trial for

TruGreen is going to say let me show you now the causation
here is going to be a 30 percent loss in revenue.
MS. WAITE-GROVER:

I think that the causation is not

about the 30 percent number.

The causation is about what

they used to -- what they used to improve that.
30 percent is the end.

I mean the

The causation is the middle.

Mr. -- the causation has to do with Ryan Mantz coming over
and telling Scotts no, no, no, no we can't do call ahead any
more because call ahead puts 50 percent of our customers at
risk at every phone call, let's reduce the number of
customers on our call ahead program.

That is the causation.

Ryan Mantz saying I have been over here at TruGreen and we
dropped our call-ahead years ago because we found out it was
just too risky, we lost too many customers every time we
made a phone call.

And he goes over to Scotts and says this

is a marketing technique, a sales technique that is going to
improve performance at our company.

That is the causation.

Mr. Elggren noticed that and we pointed that out to
Mr. Elggren in the Ryan Mantz e-mail where he described what
they were doing.

That they had a specific plan to reduce

the number of customers that were involved in this
call-ahead program.

And once that was done, Mr. Mantz

reported how many people used to be on the call-ahead

28

program and how many people are now.

Mr. Elggren then went

and looked at that e-mail and said 53 percent used to be on
the program and now only eight percent are, that means that
there is a net savings of 30 percent.
to you?

Does that make sense

The causation is about what Mr. Mantz did.

And the

calculation is about what Mr. Elggren did to link those two
figures.
THE COURT:

All right.

I think I understand the

position now.
MS. WAITE-GROVER:

Okay.

As we have gone —

based on your previous order, the

biggest thing pointed out by you is somehow the speculation
was this 30 percent figure.
guesstimate.

And it was characterized as a

And I think that what we have just gone

through right here with the math shows that the 30 percent
figure wasn't just pulled out of thin air, it was pulled out
of the memo by Ryan Mantz as well as Scott's financial
figures and it was done according to pretty simple
accounting methods of addition, subtraction and
multiplication.
Furthermore, Mr. Elggren explained some of this in his
deposition where plaintiffs are —

or defendants had the

opportunity to ask some questions about this and to
understand this figure.

So although —

so unless there is

some other degree of speculation by the court, the
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30 percent figure having substantial basis cannot justify
the court's decision to exclude his report as somehow
unreliable.

I'll point out that some of the other

assumptions that were criticized made by -- supposedly made
by Mr, Elggren that were also criticized by Mr. Rasmussen,
the defendants' expert, are really not matters -- really not
issues.

First of all, several of them are matters of law.

THE COURT: Before you get" into the details, you may
have a good argument. Part of the problem though is the way
this was presented to me that, you know, the defense said
hey, here are a whole bunch of factors you haven't taken
into account and then your response brief said well kind of
we have done the best we can and it really didn't deal with
the specifics that they came up with.
wrong?

I mean am I -- was I

To some extent 1 was holding you to the procedural

defect and the way you presented your argument. Was I
unfair in doing that?
MS. WAITE-GROVER:

I believe so. And if you look at

the Ninth Circuit case that we cited in our reply brief,
which I also have a copy of and can give to you and the
defendants, the court considered precisely the issue before
this court and that was that there was a damage expert who
had been called on to testify as to the amount of damage
incurred by a company as false advertising against another
company.
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The damage expert, like the expert in this case,
calculated damages based on the defendants' gain flowing
from the bad act, the false advertisement in that case.

And

then the defendants argued that this expert's report was
unreliable because it failed to take into account certain
confounding causes*

Those confounding causes, if you look

on Page 143 of this case, are virtually identical to ours.
These causes were things such as the weather, they point to
the drought that was going on in California, economic
recessions that may have been going on in the state,
marketing changes, changes in the market for the particular
type of trees and lawn care products sold by the companies,
other lawful competitive efforts of the defendants and just
comparison of the two products offered by the company.
The court looked at this and he said these asserted
defects in the expert's testimony go to the weight of the
evidence and not the admissibility of the expert's report.
We argued to the court that this case is essentially
identical.
THE COURT:

Here is the difference I see.

Mr. Gibb

and his team said here are all of these false confounding
variables and these variables go not to the weight to be
given to the testimony, but to its very admissibility.

And

then in your response brief you essentially punted that
issue and didn't come back.

I mean, I think if you had come
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back and said well, you know, here are some others, we think
we do have some responses to that it would be one thing.
But procedurally, you didn't do that in your opposition to
their —

to their motion at least the way I was

understanding the pleadings that were coming in.
MS. WAITE-GROVER:

Well, yes, there are two things

that I can say to that.

First, although it may not have

been specifically addressed in the pleadings, at the oral
argument motion for summary judgment, I believe Mr. Johnson
made clear we were disputing some of those facts.
THE COURT:

We typically don't let folks, especially

in a case like this where we have piles of papers on both
sides and say well, you know, my rhetorical flourish at the
oral argument is sufficient to contravene disputed fact
number 23(a)(2) or something.
MS* WAITE-GROVER:

I mean

—

Let me first point out one, we

think that on a motion to strike it is inappropriate to deem
as undisputed facts that aren't specifically controverted*
There are only two rules of civil procedure that allow a
court to do that and the first is Rule 8(d) which addresses
pleadings, complaints, counter-claims, cross-claims and so
forth.

And then the second, the one cited by the court, is

Rule 56 which is about motion for summary judgment.
The motion to* strike is not a pleading and it is not a
motion for summary judgment and therefore we believe that
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1

the court and the defendants in asserting so lack a legal

2

basis for deeming those as undisputed.

3

for some reason they are relevant factors that must be taken

4

into account, I believe that it is Ninth Circuit case that

5

clearly says that it goes to the weight and the credibility

6

of the expert's testimony.

7

account and at trial the plaintiffs are not able to rule out

8

all of those confounding or intervening causes, it just

9

makes its numbers look less credible because he didn't take

Secondly, even if

If you fail to take those into

10

those things into account.

11

admissibility of the report in and of itself because it

12

doesn't render it less reliable.
THE COURT:

13

All right.

It doesn't destroy the

I think I understand the

14

position on that.

Is there anything else critical that you

15

wanted to tell me before I get to Mr. Ingram?
MS. WAITE-GROVER:

16

No.

I think we were just going to

17

point out just as a final detail that some of the other

18

alleged defects as indicated by Mr. Rasmussen are actually

19

things such as legal conclusions.

20

One criticism he makes of Mr. Elggren is that he

21

assumes the damages to TruGreen are best measured by revenue

22

gains.

23

and that has yet to be officially determined by the court.

24

And other things are simply non-issues. . Mr. Elggren assumed

25

that Mr. Mitch Smith is an expert in lawn care acquisition.

That is a legal question that was never addressed
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He had been designated as such arid until now, even I guess

at this-point, we haven't
be stricken as such.

officially

ruled

if he is going

to

So many of the things that Mr. Dirk

Rasmussen points out about the report are not actually
factual disputes or things that relate to reliability, but
just matters before the court that will ultimately be
fleshed out in that sense.
With regards to that, I believe that is all that we
have to say on that and we urge the court to reconsider
excluding Mr. Elggren's motion.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Ms. Waite-Grover.

I'm glad to hear from Mr. Ingram now on where we end up on
Mr. Smith.
MR. INGRAM:

I guess first, Your Honor, I think it is

important to clarify the scope of Mr. Smith's Rule 72
designation as an expert witness.

It is a limited scope.

The only scope of that is how is goodwill recognized in the
lawn care industry.

To get to that, you have to go back to

the contracts which on both the old versions and the new
versions identify goodwill as something that is going to be
irrevocably harmed or damage in the contracts.

You look at

Scotts which have the same mirror almost verbatim the same
language in there.

In fact, the Scotts agreement has the

same restitutionary measure as the old TruGreen agreement
and that is any breach of any of these companies entitles
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the employer to the revenues gained by virtue of such a
breach.
So the question then becomes well, what is goodwill?
What is this intangible to the contracts we're talking
about-

So the question becomes then well, it is in both the

TruGreen agreement, some of Scotts agreement.
industry recognition of law of goodwill?

What is the

Mr- Smith's expert

testimony is based upon 21 years experience in the lawn care
business, over 45 acquisitions.

And the question is how do

you measure goodwill in the acquisition of these businesses?
And the response, goodwill is essentially the existing
customer revenue base of that company, a dollar for dollar
measure of revenues essentially, times a negotiated
multiplier or multipliers that have been done, customer
base, geography, et cetera, et cetera.
That is the scope of his expert opinion.

It is

essentially to say that the damage to goodwill is the
customer revenue generated by these new employees when they
went over to Scotts.

In other words, the goodwill that

TruGreen lost should be measured by the customer revenue and
Dirk Rasmussen's report that shows how much money they
generated on behalf of Scotts,

The rest of Mr. Smith's

testimony is left to just 7 01 lay opinion testimony which is
as region manager of the northwest region market on a weekly
basis he receives flash reports, he receives e-mail
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summaries and these flash reports it shows how many sales
representatives they have, the revenue that those sales
representatives generated for the week, and the —
and then whether or not they're up to budget.

or the

—

And from that

testimony it is in the record again, that summary judgment
record where we testified that based upon his analysis of
those documents, put him and his branch managers to prepare
the same documents that are saying theirs is going to be a
significant down turn in TruGreen's performance in 2006.
There is a budgeting process that happens at the end of
2005.

Who is involved in that budgeting process?

Mantz. • It is Larry Gaythwaite, Jason Hiller.
the standard in that budgeting process?

Ryan

And what is

They're held to

—

they're told to hey just pull a budget figure out of the
air?

No.

They're expected to provide TruGreen with a

realistic budgeted figure on what they expect to produce and
in the deposition of Cory Horlacher which we provided to
them on damages, he testifies that that budgeting is done in
large and significant part to our veteran sales
representatives and the revenues that they have produced in
the past and we expect them to produce in 2006.
THE COURT:

I mean I think he can testify that our

revenue is going down or isn't going up as fast as we
thought it was going to be.

But the —

but to help your

case at this juncture, at least as I'm understanding the
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facts, he has got tof as a lay witness, say and the causal
factor for that is those competitors over there at Scotts.
And that is where I am thinking that is outside of the realm
of 701 lay witness testimony.
MR. INGRAM:

Well, I guess that is where we1re kind of

-- where something has been conflated I think in the
defendant's argument.

There are two different distinctions.

One is there is a fact of damages and two there is a
measurement of damages*

And it seems to me we are having a

situation where because you can't provide me a specific
measure of damages, you can't show the fact of the damages.
And what Mr. Smith and what his people can say is they
can prove the fact of damages.
our budget.

In 2006 we didn't.

And that is in 2005 we met
In 2006 the reason we

didn't meet our budget is because I lost my veteran sales
representatives who were producing —
producers in 2005.
those guys.

who were my high

I lost my managers who were training

And instead of selling in 2006, I had to train

my managers to replace these guys*

I had to reshuffle the

board to make sure I was covered in Ogden for this
depletion.

I had to do all these things.

I think the very

least that establishes the fact of damages.

And case law

said, and I think we said this in summary judgment, once you
establish the fact of damages, the measure of damages, the
burden then isn't as great as showing the fact of damages.
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The case law says defendants haVe to bear some weight in
inaccuracy or something to do with the measurement of
damages because after all, why are we even dealing with this
hypothetical because of the wrong of the defendants, the
breaches of contract, the departure of the employees.

And I

think one thing the court is struggling with again is just,
you know, what is the causation?
TruGreen's loss in profits.
give the specific measure.

Well, we have talked about

Maybe we can't at this point
I don't think it can ever be

given a specific measure again, that is why I went for
preliminary injunctive relief.
but why the defendants gain?

Lost profits is one thing

Why restitutionary measure?

Well, it goes back to what some of the losses are.

There is

discussion well these guys could have gone to Hawaii.

How

can you say you had an expectation that you would produce
this in 2006 had they gone there?

That is one point.

But

the other point in general, too, is look at the competitive
market here.

Scotts was a new franchisee, couple of years

old, 2005 down in sales, they1re operating at a loss,
they're operating in the red.

In one month, they're able to

completely skip the learning curve, provide premium guys
with a ready made management and sales force to turn around
their business and start making sales.
this learning curve?

Where did they get

Was is it from Scotts?

process already in place?

Was it some

No, it was from these employees.
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1

It was from TruGreen.

2

Mantz's 13 years of experience at TruGreen that cost

3

TruGreen money, that cost TruGreen experience here in the

4

Utah marketplace not in Hawaii.

5

months start cranking out numbers showing who is the top

6

performers in Salt Lake in Idaho, surprise surprise it is

7

Stephensen, LeBlanc, Van Acker.

8

exhibits to TruGreen's summary judgment motion.

9

Causation.

It was from the benefit was from Ryan

Scotts is able to within

These are attached as

Again we look at Exhibit J to TruGreen"s

10

summary judgment motion.

Ryan Mantz, the new corporate

11

development and expansion director subject less direct mail

12

more sales.

13

rebutted by defendants, that has never been said is somehow

14

inaccurate, but that is March 6th what is he attributing the

15

success to?

He is not attributing it to the weather.

He is

16

not attributing it to the processes already in place.

He is

17

saying hey, we did good last year, we're doing good this

18

year, no immense improvements over last year.

19

team has improved immensely over last year.

20

the other exhibits.

21

five performers are all former TruGreen employers.

22

time to pat our sales managers on the back.

23

saving our bacon by teaching these guys how to maximize and

24

relief who are these sales managers.

25

is Larry Gaythwaite.

An exhaustive analysis that has never been

Our sales

Let's look at

Who is this sales team?

Well, the top
Take

They're really

It is Matt Walker.

It is Jason Hiller.

It

It is Ryan Mantz.
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Former TruGreen employees.

Thank our rep and sales managers

for not turning in a $228,000

year to date based upon 2005

deficiencies, and instead getting us to the 900,000 mark
through February.

If this is not causation or the fact of

damages, Your Honor, I'm not really sure what it is,
THE COURT:

All right.

Let's assume you have

convinced me on that, so there is damage.

But then now we

know that damages have to be proven with some, you know,
what is the phrase, reasonable certainty or something like
that.
MR. INGRAM:

Well I think first it is a more strict

burden to show whether you have been damaged in fact and the
burden is somewhat, I think, in this case you may be even
more diminished when you're going into measurement of
damages and that is in the TruGreen summary judgment motion
and the -- again -THE COURT:

But the damage could be a dollar or it

could be you all are asking for $2.7 million.

I mean, you

know, assume you got a jury verdict for $2.7 million.
that just be speculation?
MR. INGRAM:
THE COURT:

Would

I mean --

Well, I'm -What would be the specific, you know, what

would be the specific underpinnings for some verdict like
that?
MR. INGRAM:

Well, the specific underpinnings, I
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think, are the numbers that have been generated through
here.

We can show how much Mr. LeBlanc sold for Scotts' in

2006.

We can show how much these other defendants sold in

2006,

We can show how these branches performed in 2006

based upon the numbers.

And I guess the issue is well these

intervening causes go to the amount and should effect
should effect the amount or what not.

—

But, again, Your

Honor, why are we analyzing these intervening factors?
it because TruGreen hasn't been damaged?

No.

Is

We're

analyzing these factors because they have created the wrong.
There has been an increase in revenue and the case law says
that they have to bear some of the burden for that.

They

have to bear some of the burden to say no, this is not why
we increased.
saying —

And where in Dirk Rasmussen's report is it

is it attributed to other factors.

THE COURT:

Well —

Is it all coming down to the issue, talk

me through here, I think some things are crystallizing.
it all coming down to a restitution notion?
that they get ought to come back to you.

Is

That a dollar

Is that —

is

that -MR, INGRAM:
THE COURT:

So

MR. INGRAM:
burden in that-

Yes.
—

And I think defendants should bear some

That if there is some inaccuracies

associated with that, they need to bear some burden in

showing why there is an actual inaccuracy there because they
have created the problem.

They have —

they have brought

the guys over who generated the revenue for this.

They have

created the problem and I think that Mr. Rasmussen has got
to have a similar burden than just saying well, he hasn't
considered the weather, he hasn't considered new products,
he hasn't considered this.
these factors.

He can go on and on and on about

But curiously omitted from this report is

any quantification of that.

It is simply, well, they put

out more direct mailers in 2006 and that is why they sold
more.

The e-mail of their own witness rebuts that.

direct mail, more sales.

Less

And I guess if -- I guess we're

coming back here we need to keep these things separate, the
fact of damage and the measurement of damages.
THE COURT:
MR. INGRAM:

Right.
And the measurement we have got are the

revenues that these guys generated.
figures.

Those are hard dollar

If they're going to show some inaccuracy there, I

think they need to bear some of that burden.

Urn, some of

these intervening factors from the deposition of
*Mr. Rasmussen is identified they couldn't have been
accounted for because more didn't have the daily access to
them in their records.

And maybe Mr. Johnson can clarify

that a little bit more but
THE COURT:

—

I mean the reason —

let's go back to the
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1

restitution point.

Now sitting here right this second, it

2

seems to me that if I ruled that yeah restitution is the

3

proper measure of damages here, and then as you suggested

4

there is circumstantial evidence from which a jury could

5

conclude that you all have been damaged, and now, well, okay

6

well what would be one measure of restitution?

7

Stephensen made $280,000 in sales for them and that should

8

have been for you all.

9

get -- I hate to suggest more briefing here, but what we

Well,

But I'm wondering whether I should

10

really need then is briefing on whether restitution is the

11

right measure of damages because I'm not sure or is that

12

stipulated?

13

MR. INGRAM:

That is briefed.

That is basically the

14

essence of our damages.

15

contracts which say, at least in the old agreements and new

16

agreements which say the revenue increase, i.e. restitution

17

that they -- the unfair competitive gain.

18

all about unfair competition, the unfair competitive gain.

19

The ability of Scotts to skip that learning curve that cost

20

TruGreen money and years of experience.

21

measure that?

Because it is supported by the

Again, this is

And how do you

And again, coming back down to the measurement, I

22
23

think it is something different from the —

from the fact

24

again because frankly the guys like Ryan Mantz they're not

25

—

they're not out there hitting the pavement like these

guys, I guess, and making the sales.

They are not

attributing a dollar figure to these guys.
that there is no harm?

Does that mean

Does that mean that he hasn't harmed

TruGreen somehow by showing Scotts the methods or his new
management technique?

No, of course there is harm there.

But how do you measure that?

And the case law says, well,

the defendants have got to bear some of the burden of that.
Again, the hypothetical is only made a hypothetical by the
very wrong of the defendant.

Ryan Mantz again, you know,

thank our reps and. sales manager-

I'm sorry I sound like a

broken record here, Your Honor, but I guess -THE COURT:

No, I think I'm getting a feel for your

position now so I appreciate that.
critical?

Is there anything

I should hear from the other side here at some

point.
MR. INGRAM:

No.

MR. JOHNSON:

If you want that brief, Your Honor,

we'll be happy to do it.
THE COURT:

Right.

Mr. Johnson says he is happy to do

it, Mr. Ingram.
MR. INGRAM:
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:
MR. INGRAM:

I guess so.
I'm -Is it unanimous?
I'll be happy to spend some time on that,

Your Honor.
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THE COURT:

It was briefed.

kind of take a short cut.

I guess I was hoping to

And as you know, my tentative

opinion said well, we'll duck that issue.

And maybe as I

think through it with you I want to hear from the other side
on this, maybe that is the critical issue here because
restitution is the right measure, it would be my tentative
thought is you do have some evidence of things that could be
restitution.
MR. INGRAM:

Again, I guess I think why it wouldn't be

beneficial again remember one of the problems of having to
deal with here from the beginning the losses that we have
heard from the defendants is well, this loss of customers
and it is even reflected again in Dirk Rasmussen's report.
I have seen no causation because I haven't seen the shift in
customers.
Well, again, what are the critical issues here?
the customers or is it the training?

Is it

Is it the know how?

Is it, again, the ability to skip the learning curve.
think, again at this point, dismissing —

And I

conflating

measurement of damages or putting together a measurement of
damages and the fact of damages together and then drawing an
inference in favor of Scotts on- their motion I guess just
seemed to me not a firm enough basis to grant summary
judgment.

I

It seems to me if we can show causation, maybe

not prove causation or at least draw a reasonable inference
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of causation through the numbers, their e-mails, they are
all part of the suitunary judgment record, and it is simply an
issue of measurement which we're saying we have got numbers,
we can figure this out somehow.

Something that should go to

trial.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Ingram.

Mr. Gibb, I'm glad to hear from you all on all of
these subjects*

Let me just give you a heads up.

The thing

that I'm thinking where the plaintiffs have made some
headway on is the theory that damages could be done on a
restitution basis and we have got evidence in the record of
sales and so forth that support restitution as a measure of
damages.

So I'm glad to hear -- I don't know how you want

to structure your presentation, but that is one point I'm
hoping that you'll touch on.
MR. GIBB:

I'll be happy to, Your Honor.

Mr. Olson

and I are going to divide the time and I think it may be
appropriate to simply address the exhibits that have been
proffered to the court and to alert, the court as to how
they're being misconstrued.

In the first instance though I

must say that the preliminary injunction of the plaintiffs
did not say that they did not suffer any damages.

Indeed

they submitted a report and a letter from Mr. Elggren
regarding their damages that he has since abandoned in his
expert report..

So this has been firmly in front of the
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1

court from day one and the plaintiffs have been pleading it

2

from day one but have failed to do so with the specificity

3

necessary here.

4

They have now lost their expert, according to the

5

court's prior ruling, because he failed to do what?

6

failed to show that our profit was their lost goodwill which

7

is the restitutionary basis that the court is considering at

8

this point.

9

He

This is another iteration of Mr. Elggren's improper

10

reasoning and calculation in his expert report.

They have

11

just renamed it as a legal theory at this point in time.

12

The court will need to consider several things with regard

13

to Exhibit 20 that they have prorfered to the court.

14

THE COURT:

That is these blow ups here?

15

MR. GIBB:

16

you were given.

17

at paragraphs 195 and 196, and I'll try to read not quickly

18

for your reporter here, it says, "Mr. Elggren failed to

19

appropriately consider that a certain amount of Mower

20

Brothers revenues during the damage period are and were

21

attributed to the Mower Brothers employees who have never

22

been affiliated with TruGreen.

23

certain amount of Mower Brothers revenues that are not

24

associated with any particular employee but rather are

25

ascribed to advertising sources.

That is these blow ups and the ones that
It is discussed in Mr. Rasmussen's report

Furthermore, there are a

From the Mower Brothers
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data base, I was able to find the revenue generated by both
the defendants and by employees who worked at Mower Brothers
but were not previously affiliated with TruGreen.

The break

down of these amounts could be seen in Exhibit 20 which is
before the court.

Based on this analysis, I found that

65 percent of the total revenue was generated by employees
who have never been affiliated with TruGreen.

As shown in

Exhibit 20, if Mr, Elggren had analyzed Mower Brothers data
base, which was available to him, he would have found that
contrary to some of the underlying assumptions in his
economic damage calculations, the revenue increases were not
primarily attributed to the defendant employees, but rather
to non-defendant employees."
That is how Mr. Rasmussen created Exhibit 20 and that
is what he went back and used it for.

You have to take

Mr. Rasmussen at his word that he has done precisely the
thing that Mr. Ingram just argued.

We have gone out and

taken their restitutionary theory, that Mr. Elggren
proffered, and come up with the other factors and shown the
court that even under that theory, and even under that
theory as calculated by lost profits because you have to
calculate it by reducing revenues with costs and other
things, that all of these other factors do not point to
damages being suffered by these plaintiffs.

Indeed, given

all of the factors that the court has previously ruled were
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1

relevant, he has shown in his report, and the plaintiffs

2

have not rebutted it, that all of those factors dictate

3

dismissal as the court's preliminary ruling suggests.

4

THE COURT:

Here is —

I think you may — you know,

5

maybe —

6

factual argument.

7

crystalizing it.

8

at trial Stephensen, let's say.

9

last year for TruGreen?

I have got a legal question and you're making a
Let me give you this as a way of
So Mr. Johnson calls as his first witness
So how much did you sell

I sold 280,000 or maybe it is less,

10

you know, but it is some amount.

11

judge, that is our damage figure 280,000.

12

restitution.

13

sales or maybe you would have to make it profits, let's say

14

the profit margin on that is whatever so say it is 50,000 in

15

profits.

16

as a restitution for competing when he shouldn't have.

17

And then he says, okay,
We want

Is he legally entitled to take Stephensen"s

Is he entitled to get that legally back to Scotts

MR. GIBB:

I think the court has answered that in its

18

prior order very expressly no.

19

that the court said that the defendants have offered as an

20

undisputed fact, and TruGreen has not contested it, that

21

various factors would have to be taken into account in

22

developing such a calculation and then it lists, on Page 39

23

and 40 of the order, factors A through I which would also

24

necessarily have to be taken into count when calculating

25

that revenue.

And it is also —

And the reason for that is

this is all tied together

because it is also the very reason that Mitch Smith cannot
say the very same thing that Mr. Elggren attempts to say.
And that is, I had revenues in 2005.
2006.

And now it didn't get met.

I set a budget in

And so therefore any loss

that I get from that is attributable to them, and any gain
that they realize is my restitution.

No.

The court knows

and has previously ruled, correctly we believe, that the
appropriate measure of damage must consider these other
factors.

And the plaintiffs were under an obligation at

summary judgment to go ahead and rebut those contentions as
contained in the report of Mr. Rasmussen.
so.

They failed to do

And the court found they were deemed admitted and they

are now the record on summary judgment before the court.
So with respect to that issue, even if you start with
the restitutionary basis, and you have to consider these
other additional factors.

And we did that, even though we

weren't obligated to do so on summary judgment,
Mr. Rasmussen went through, and I'll just cite the court
quickly.
THE COURT:

I mean I'm still —

let me just bring you

back because this is where I'm getting hung up here.

I

thought I was ruling on sort of a lost profit damage
calculation expert saying, you know, these folks were
competing and it hurt these folks by X amount and I'm saying
wait a minute, to do that you have got to take into account
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1

all these other factors:

2

MR. GIBB:

3

THE COURT:

I agree
But if they said okay, we're going to

simplify .it much more.

You made a dollar, you made 280, 000

in sales, we should get that as restitution.
is —

I mean where

does the law allow you to do that?
MR. GIBB:
THE COURT:
MR. GIBB:

basis for that.

No.
So help me understand.
No, because there has to be a causation
The court, as it properly found in its

prior opinion, stated that you have to. go through and show
how it is attributable to each of the individual defendants.
And you have to go through and -THE COURT:

See that is the answer they say okay

Stephensen he is the defendant here, 280,000 in sales, we
want his sales, they should have been ours, we want them.
We want them for us.
MR. GIBB:

Um, no.

Legally they have to show why they

are entitled to that from a causation standpoint and they
have to be able to do that with the facts in the case.
Mr. Rasmussen has testified at Paragraph 73 of his report
regarding the causation elements that would need to be
considered when looking at that measure, and he is also
analyzed at Paragraph 160 through 191 of his report what is
wrong with Mr* Elggren's methodology with respect to that

51

issue.

Mr. Elggren assumed what the defendants are asking

you to do and that is namely that there was a restitution
basis.

The only thing they have to prove is this amount

that Scotts made.

And the court properly found that the

true measure of damage in this case is lost profits because
you do have to make appropriate reductions.

And then when

calculating lost profits, that you have to calculate these
other factors-

And my other point to you is, even if you

were to take a restitution basis and say it is that flat
amount, you are still going to have to reduce it by the
factors that Mir. Rasmussen considered and then ultimately
explained it in his expert —

expert report.

Now Mr. Olson is going to talk a little bit more about
that and I can visit the other parts that I was going to
talk about were and I can just briefly give you an outline
of where I was going.
March 16th memo.

First of all, Mr, Mantz*s memo is a

So it takes into account from January to

March 16th of 2006.

Mr. Rasmussen's report is for the

entire year from October, in fact before that, from October
of 2005, to be safe, through December of 2006.

So to the

extent that the court is looking at data, it should look at
Mr. Rasmussen1s report with respect to that.
Urn, with respect to
THE COURT:

—

Can we go back to the restitution.

still hung up on this.

I'm

And maybe it is because my
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background, as you all know, is probably more on the
criminal side of things.
So in a criminal case, if a bank robber goes in and
takes $10,000 from a bank and, you know, he is convicted,
you know, give the $10,000 back.
MR. GIBB: Right.
THE COURT: So when -I hear Mr. Johnson and Mr. Ingram
say okay, restitution, we had a guy working for us,
Stephensen, let's say, and he was making sales for us. Now
he is making sales over there and we want restitution.

I am

thinking, okay, whatever he sold over there, they're saying
just give it back to us and they have got the numbers to
show what that is. Is there something legally wrong or
chronologically wrong with that?
MR, GIBB: Yes. Restitution puts the party back in
the position it was prior to the damage being incurred. And
so in order to do that, you have to not only factor what was
gained over here, but what it cost to do that. And then you
also have to show that that was causally linked to their
damage.

Because the gain of one party does not necessarily

mean that this -- that is this other party's damage. And
therefore you have to show connections for each of the
defendants as to why this amount of increase is their
damage. And there are a number of factors that
Mr. Rasmussen goes through, there is branding, there is —
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there is number of employees.

There is a number of other

factors that he has talked about in his report regarding
what needs to be considered.
employees-

Relative experience of the

Whether or not their job duties were similar at

TruGreen and at Scotts.

Whether or not they were in the

same geographic area and other things like that.
All of those factors need to be considered when
fashioning a restitution based remedy.

Now, they would like

you to say that we have expert testimony from Mr. Elggren.
That Mr. Elggren has said based upon the Scotts franchise
agreement, there is a dollar for dollar correlation between
goodwill being purchased in a re-purchase by Scotts of a
franchise under its franchise agreement, and that means that
that equals goodwill that we have lost.

No.

They have to

show that relationship causally, with all of the evidence
that is currently before the court on the summary judgment
record, they have failed to rebut it in the summary judgment
record, and it is now undisputed for that reason.
THE COURT:

See you keep moving into the facts and I'm

still thinking law here.

I'm still thinking that I heard

from the plaintiffs in their briefs that it is an unresolved
question of Utah law as to whether you can just, you know,
award restitution on a competitor, move it over from -MR, GIBB:
THE COURT:

Let me let Mr. Olson address that.
I appreciate —

your advocacy is always
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very gpod but maybe I'm
MR. GIBB:

—

If you have questions about the

reconsideration or -THE COURT:

I'm not trying to —

that is to say I'm

not — - I appreciated the arguments of Ms. Waite-Grover, but
Irm still not convinced that on that particular piece I
still think I made the right decision on getting Elggren out
of here.

But maybe you want to take a run at this,

Mr. Olson.
MR. OLSON:

I'll take my best shot.

understand your question.

I think I

I've tried to follow where you're

going with this and I think Mark is right.
focus —

he got into the facts.

I would like to

I would like to focus a

little bit more on the law.
First, we have —

we have addressed the proper measure

of damages ad nauseam in our briefs.

Our summary judgment

opposition went on for several pages, it was Page 40 to 51
of our summary judgment opposition where we addressed the
measure of damages.

What is interesting about TruGreen's

recent briefing, particularly the reply brief, is that no
Utah or Idaho cases are cited with respect to restitution
allegedly being a proper measure of damages.
Utah courts and Idaho courts have already spoken on
this.

They have already stated that restitution is not the

proper measure of damages both for the contract breaches
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that we're dealing with, and for the tortious interference
claims that have been raised-

And you know Mr. Gibb

mentioned that restitution is putting the party back in a
position that it was in had the breach not occurred.

And

that is reflected in the Polyglycol case which was a
restitution case in Utah that is cited in TruGreen's reply
brief.

I don't have the —

reply brief.

it is actually Page 6 of the

They cite the Polyglycol case which says that

an action for restitution is appropriate when claiming
recision as an alternative to an action for damages.

The

problem with that is this is a damages case, not a recision
case.

There has been no attempt to rescind any of the

contracts they are instead claiming damages.

The Dunn case,

I think, resolves some of the concerns that the court
mentioned.

And I didn't print an extra copy.

Frankly I

didn't expect to get too heavily into restitution today.
THE COURT:

See the thing that —

what has been

crystallized in my mind is I have been trying to avoid, I
guess, doing the hard work of figuring out what the law is
on damages, thinking oh, we'll do that when we get to jury
instructions and so forth.

But I think the oral argument at

least to me has crystallized that I have got to get firmly
in mind what the measure of damages is before I can rule on
whether one side or the other has enough evidence on that.
And it seems to me to be pretty clear that if the measure
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were dollars you all were earning, could be handed over to
them and they have got evidence of that and I shouldn't
grant summary judgment.

But if the measure is more figure

out exactly how much, you know, you were disadvantaged by
all of this, then you're on a stronger footing for summary
judgment argument along the lines of my tentative order.
MR. OLSON:

I understand.

And I have plenty of other

things I could talk about, but let's focus on this.
THE COURT:

This is the one that is troubling me the

most right now.
MR. OLSON:
case.

The Dunn case was kind of an interesting

It is an Idaho Court of Appeals case and it dealt

with a breach of a covenant not to compete that was
ancillary to a sale of the business.
And Mr. Johnson referenced it today and said that the
Dunn case adopted some sort of restitutionary
measure.

I'm not aware that you'll find the word

restitution any where in the case and, in fact, it says just
the opposite-

It says that lost profits is the measure of

damages.
THE COURT:

Is Dunn your best case?

MR. OLSON:

Is Dunn our best case?

THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. OLSON:

Urn, as to the measure of damage?

THE COURT: Yes.
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MR. OLSON:

For breach of a covenant not to compete, I

think it probably is our best case.
THE COURT:
for a while.

Let me —

I think it makes sense to give my court

reporter a break.
Dunn.

I'm thinking, we have been going

To take 15 minutes.

I'll take a look at

I should ask Mr. Johnson and Mr. Ingram what is your

best case on this that you would like me to take a look at?
MR. OLSON:

Could I just say pages 61 to 62.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. OLSON:

Where it talks about lost profits being

the measure and where the plaintiff's lost profits claim was
rejected because he didn't focus on his own losses but
focused on the defendants gains.
THE COURT:

And for your side, was there a case I

should be looking at?
MR. JOHNSON:

Probably in our summary judgment motion/

the National Merchandising case-

I don't know if I have --

if we have the citation, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

What is the cite on that case?

MS. WAITE-GROVER:

348 Northeast 2d 771.

That is a

Massachusetts case.
THE COURT:
minute break.

All right.

Why don't we take about a 15

I know we've been going on for a while here,

but this is an important juncture in the case and is that
convenient?
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1

MR. OLSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

2

MR. JOHNSON:

3

MR. OLSON:

Yes, it is.
If I could just add, Dunn is our best case

4

on lost profits for breach of contract in Idaho.

It is the

5

Robbins case that we have cited that in assessing actual

6

damages for breach of a non-compete in Utah.

7

Robbins case.

8

cited, they are all cited in those pages of our brief and

9

they include, let's see, here it is, in Utah the Sampson

It is the

The tortious interference cases that we have

10

case which recognizes the restatement of tort section

11

774(a).

12

same restatement provision.

13

the loss of benefits under the contract or consequential

14

damages caused by the interference is the-measure.

15

those are the cases, Judge.

16
17

And in Idaho, the Barlow case which adopts that

THE COURT:

Both of those cases say that

And

They have given my a couple more cases.

Do you want to give me a couple more?

18

MR. JOHNSON:

I think the careful reading of the

19

Storage Tech, Your Honor, notwithstanding the treatment of

20

the expert in that case is eerily similar to the treatment

21

of the expert in this case.

22

restitutionary measure and I think, Heather, do you have the

23

cite?

24
25

MS. WAITE-GROVER:

I think it does support the

I'll give you a third citation.

is the restatement second of tort section 774(a)

It

particularly Comment C where it talks about actual losses
being difficult in certain contract cases.
THE COURT:

Restatement —

MS. WAITE-GROVER:
THE COURT:

I'm sorry, 774*

A.

A as in apple?

MS. WAITE-GROVER:
THE COURT:

Correct.

Is there a comment in particular?

MS. WAITE-GROVER:
THE COURT:

Comment C.

Why don't we —

if it is convenient for

you all, I know we have a lot of lawyers here and
everything, but could you come back at 12:30?
MR. JOHNSON:
MR. OLSON:
MR. INGRAM:

Is that

—

Sure.

That is fine.
With respect to this, this has been

briefed pretty heavily.

If you go back to summary judgment,

all these cases are in there including one factor which I
think is important, which is the reason why restitution
becomes important is when you have all these competing
interests and not simply just customer A and customer B
which is a big factor in lost profits but extraordinary
training.
THE COURT:

I think I let the lawyers down here

because when I was doing my first summary judgment ruling, I
said okay, let's just park damages over here and let's focus
on liability.

And then having done that, now I got some
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more briefing on causality but I didn't go back to read the
cases in the briefs as thoroughly as I should have.

So in

20 minutes I'll try to rectify that error just a little bit
and see you all shortly,
MR. GIBB:

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. JOHNSON:

Thank you.

{Recess.)
THE COURT:

All right*

I have had a chance to review

some of the cases and I apologize to everyone for keeping
everyone through lunch here.

I also apologize because I

think I have created some difficulty here in an effort to
mentally compartmentalize when we would address some issues
and when we wouldn't and I kept thinking that this is a jury
instruction issue so I can deal with that in a week or two
but I clearly should have been focusing on it more.

And I

have tried to focus on it during the break.
As I sit here right now, this is what I am thinking.
The issue is whether there is some measure of restitutionary
damages that is gained to the defendant that can now be
handed over to the plaintiff.

And then we're in Idaho and

Utah so the question boils down does Idaho recognize that
and does Utah recognizes that.

My current thought is Idaho

does not recognize such a theory based on the Dunn case in
which there is a sentence that says the measure of damages
is not the amount of profits made by the defendant, rather
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it is the amount of profit lost to the plaintiff because of
the breach.

I suppose

you could try to distinguish that or

something but that seems to me to be a pretty good
indication of the Idaho courts would not recognize the
theory,
Utah law, however, seems to me to be an open question.
Sampson talks about the fact, as Mr. Ingram was pointing
out, that once the act of damages has been established, you
can go with the lesser proof on the amount of damages over
nonetheless you have to have reasonable assumptions or
projections-

And it is still very difficult for me to see

how the plaintiff is going to do that.

But the plaintiffs

have said way wait a minute, the way we're going to do it is
the way they do it out in Massachusetts in these cases like
National Merchandising Corporation versus Layden.

There

they don't even mess around at least with the plaintiffs
election they don•t have to mess around with showing that
there has been a loss to the plaintiff.

You can simply show

gain to the defendant and that is enough to move —

to move

forward.
So the way I see things, the question boils down to
whether the Utah Supreme Court would follow the lead of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in cases like
National Merchandising Corporation in recognizing that
theory.

And as I read through the cases, I don't see
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anything that really gives me much of a feeling for what the
Utah courts would do with this.

I don't see —

I see the

recision case that is Polyglycol being a recision case which
I think is distinguishable.

Robbins versus Finlay and the

liquidated damages case that doesn't seem to me to speak to
that.

And Sampson, while talking about loss to the

plaintiff, doesn't seem to foreclose this other theory.

If

it were to up me, if I were the one that got to write the
law, I would say the Massachusetts court has it right.

That

restitution ought to be a reasonable measure of damages.
But this isn't a question for me to decide.

It is a

question of what Utah law would be and what the Utah courts
would recognize.

If I were to rule this second, my thought

is that I would certify to the Utah Supreme Court the
question of whether it would follow the lead of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court on this theory.

I wonder if

that looks like a cop out because it will slow the case down
for a while.
But the problem is if I move forward now, I have got
to*make a prediction one way or another.

If I grant summary

judgment for the defense on the theory that the Utah Supreme
Court would not recognize the theory, then plaintiff goes up
I guess to the Tenth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit would
probably say I think the same thing I'm thinking.
know what Utah law is-

We don't

We have to ask the Utah Supreme
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Court.
On the other hand, if I rule against the defense and
rule in favor of the plaintiff and say I'm going to go with
the theory that the Utah courts would follow the
Massachusetts case, then we have a whole trial and all of
the money attendant to that on a flimsy legal foundation.
So that is what I did in the last 20 minutes.

I think

Mr. Olson is up to bat and that is where I'm sitting right
now.

I'm glad to hear from either you or Mr. Gibb about

where we are going.
MR. OLSON:

I'll start.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. OLSON:

Okay.

I want to stick to these issues and

then perhaps I'll just quickly respond to some of the other
issues that we wanted to talk about.
through those.

Okay.

I'll try to breeze

First, I do want to make clear that

we have got both contract claims and tortious interference
claims•
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. OLSON:

And even within a contract realm we have

multiple different claims that have been raised.

Some of

which have already been discarded, some of which are still
in play.
THE COURT:

And Irm painting with a broad bush here

but I'm thinking the legal issues are similar regardless of
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which of the contract claims we're under and I haven't
really conceptualized whether it is different on a contract
claim or a tort claim.
would arise on both.

But I'm assuming similar issues
The Massachusetts case is a tort case,

I would take it, and there is still —

there are still

—

are there still Utah tort claims alive at this point?
MR. OLSON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

So the Utah

MR. OLSON:

The Utah tortious interference claims are

—

still alive and I think those can be disposed of for the
same reasons as the Idaho cases in light of the restatement
of torts.

I guess what I would like to do is maybe separate

out the different contract claims and separate out from
those contract claims the tort claims.

Because I do think

different legal principles will apply.

And in the event the

court is going to go ahead and make some certification,
certainly we don't think that would be necessary and I will
explain why, but it should be narrowly limited to what is
left, I guess-

It can't be decided based on the law that we

have.
First as to -- let me just start with the tortious
interference claims.

And pointing specifically to Sampson V

Richins, which is the Utah Supreme Court case, excuse me,
Utah Court of Appeals, not Supreme Court, 770 P2d 998, it
addresses on Page 1006 and 1007 the restatement second of
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torts.

Now the reference that was made by Ms. Waite-Grover

is to comment of that restatement that says that damages are
difficult to prove.

We understand that damages are

difficult to prove.

They still need to be proven with some

degree of reasonable certainty.

And it is the restatement

section itself that dictates what that measure is and it
says, in this case, that it recognizes the restatement
provision that says damages are limited to the pecuniary
loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective
relation or consequential losses for which the interference
is a legal cause.
And then the court goes on to say, referring to judge
Croft, the trial judge, "thus, Judge Croft's findings must
identify actual pecuniary losses suffered by Richtron, the
plaintiff, as a result of Sampson's conduct."

Okay.

So

tortious interference in Utah requires an assessment of the
actual losses as a result of, as it says, so, caused by the
tortious interference.

So we think that is established.

Nothing in this case would lead to a conclusion that some
sort of restitutionary measure of damages would apply.
THE COURT:

I haven't had a chance to work through all

of the case lav/ supporting the Massachusetts approach to
this, but I'm assuming the Massachusetts approach to this
was not crafted in ignorance of the fact that the
restatement talks about losses and so forth.
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MR. OLSON:

Certainly.

And courts are entitled to

take different sides of issues.

But unfortunately, for

TruGreen's position, we are stuck with what the Utah Court
of Appeals and Supreme Court have said with respect to these
issues.

And since that statement has been made by the Court

of Appeals, we think that the court should follow it.
Again, with respect to the tortious interference
claims, and the Barlow case and the other case that we have
cited on damages brief, or excuse me, in our summary
judgment opposition in Idaho it also recognized this
restatement provision which again focuses on the pecuniary
loss of the benefits of the contract.
contract aren't some one else's gains.
plaintiff's losses.

The benefits of the
They're the

And it is that simple with respect to

tortious interference.
Going to the contract issues, Your Honor, and again as
I mentioned, there are several different contract issues.
The one specific issue that was raised in Dunn was the
covenant not to compete which is one of the four claims that
have been raised in this case.

As for the covenant not to

compete, Your Honor has already noted as in Dunn that it is
limited to lost profits.

The reason that causation comes

into play, with respect to the different damages or excuse
me summary judgment going the wrong direction to the
different breach of contract claims, again for breach of the
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confidentiality provision, the non-solicitation of
customers, the non-interference of employees, the reason
that causation is so important is because different damages
flow from those breaches.
Let's take an example.
Stephensen.

We have talked about

We should probably talk about someone else

because the court has already determined that he didn't have
a covenant not to compete.
guys.

Clogston.

So let's pick one of the Idaho

James Clogston, let's assume, as has

happened, that he has gone from TruGreen to Mower Brothers.
He gets to Mower Brothers and, you know, our opinion, again,
I don't want to delve into facts, but it goes to show how
causation is important.
on heavy advertising*

Mower Brothers business is centered

Mr. Clogston was an inquiry salesman

meaning that these fliers-would go out to people and they
would return them or they would call in and say yeah, I want
to sign up.

And Clogston is the inquiry salesman sitting in

the office, calls them back and makes the sale.

Okay?

What

TruGreen has to show is that it would have obtained those
sales had Clogston not breached his covenant not to compete.
And what that has to take into account is, for example, is
as-mentioned in Mr. Rasmussen's affidavit and as the court
recognized in its summary judgment order, that the court
would need to take into account would TruGreen have obtained
that sale?

What kind of advertising does TruGreen do.?

Does
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it do a sufficient level of advertising that it would have
obtained that customer?
factors.

And so on with the other causation

Those have to be taken into account before the

court can say that that particular sale to a particular
customer by James Clogston would have been obtained by
TruGreen if not breached.

And that is the analysis that

Mr. Elggren failed to do and it is this precise same
analysis that TruGreen's lay witnesses cannot replicate.
Mr. Elggren has not attempted to do it even though
Mr. Rasmussen, as illustrated by his expert report, laid out
the framework for being able to do it, that it can be done.
They just haven't done it.
being difficult to compute.

This isn't an issue of damages
It is an issue of damages not

having been computed and the proper assessment not having
been done.
So I would like to submit, I suppose, the issues
relating to the measure of damages with that unless the
court has any other questions relating to the cases or any
of those issues.
THE COURT:

So I mean you —

Massachusetts, you would lose.

if we're in

Is that a premise we both --

MR. OLSON:

As to tortious interference?

THE COURT:

As to tortious interference.

MR. OLSON:

Perhaps.

interference.

Perhaps as to tortious

But that is a completely different issue.
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And again, tortious interference they have to show that the
actual interference with a contract resulted in this damage.
In Massachusetts perhaps it is a little bit different.

But

here, you have to show that that tortious interference
caused you an item of damage which has not been shown.
again procedurally we're here on summary judgment.

And

It was

their burden to come forward with some evidence showing such
a loss on summary judgment.

And what Your Honor has heard

today, as has been stated in TruGreen's latest briefing, is
not what damages have been shown, it is what damages we hope
or we think we might be able to show, our witnesses may have
the wherewithal to showthat.

And it is a little too late for

We have to have something now and it has to have been

presented already.
Urn, there hasn't been any alternative damages theory
that TruGreen has come up with.

The restitution theory that

we have been dealing with today is the same one that
Mr. Elggren attempted.

We have not seen any evidence that

would permit any lay witness to be able to replicate it.
Urn, one issue I would like to point out so that the record
is clear, is that TruGreen*s own -- TruGreen has made some
statements in its briefs just recently, now that it is
starting to actually try to focus on its own losses,
TruGreen has made a statement in its reply brief, this is on
- - o n Page 14 and Page 15 of its damages reply brief, that
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TruGreen has suffered certain iost sales or lost revenues
from 2005 to 2006.

But I would like to point out, and it

has been mentioned today, is that there is no evidence in
the summary judgment record, that TruGreen lost sales and
lost customers from 2005 to 2006.

In fact, TruGreen*s own

evidence suggests the opposite.
Mr. Omas, O-M-A-S, however you say his name, he stated
in his deposition, this is one of TruGreen's own witnesses,
that TruGreen had more customers at its Boise office in 2006
than it had in 2005.
56 of his deposition.

This is his testimony on Page 55 and
So the evidence shows that if

anything, TruGreen gained customers from 2005 to 2006.
Briefly, with respect to Exhibit 93, and I won't; waste
a lot of time on that, Mr. Johnson did indicate that their
evidence of a causal connection between breaches and losses
is Exhibit 93,

We have moved to strike it.

The reason

being is number one it has never been offered on summary
judgment, it has never been authenticated.
by someone else.

It was prepared

It was never submitted in an affidavit in

this case and the court shouldn't consider it.
THE COURT:

Is there —

I didn't see in your pleadings

a Daubert type challenge or Kumho Tire type challenge and
frankly it occurs to me that that is the more central
problem with that document rather than, you know, some
question, some technical question of foundation or
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authentication or something like that.
MR. OLSON:

Well, I think that is true.

They would

need an expert to be able to come in and tie together the
allegations of that document.
certain what it alleges.

Whatever they are, we're not

But it -- it purports to be a

comparison between TruGreen employees and our employees, or
former TruGreen employees.

An expert would need to come in

and lay some foundation for it and show how that creates
some sort of causation of damages.
THE COURT:

I didn't see that in your pleadings yet

and I'm wondering whether that —

does that come up in a

couple of weeks at the final pretrial, something by way of a
motion in limine?
MR. OLSON:

Well

—

THE COURT:

The way I see that document is, you know,

from your perspective, and obviously the plaintiff has a
different perspective, and some sales person says by golly
look at all the people that left.

I bet we would have made

$2.7 million more if they were here and writes that down.
The -- and the sales person is just speculating, let's
assume.

We wouldn't admit Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 93

with that number written down because it would be simply
speculation.
Now, if a qualified expert said by golly having
considered all of the relevant factors, I think it is 2.7
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million and writes that down, then we would be in a
different situation.

So the real question is whether the

person writing down the numbers had a sufficient evidentiary
or sufficient expertise to reach that conclusion.

That

seems to me to be the issue presented there.
MR. OLSON-:

I understand.

The 7 02 challenge to that

really goes through the motion to exclude Mitch Smith as an
expert.

To the extent Mitch Smith is being used to bring in

that document, certainly he is not qualified to opine as to
how that creates some sort of damages theory.

There has

been no damages theory that has been presented to us or
damages calculation in initial disclosures or on summary
judgment that relates to that document.

It is a document

that has been thrown in in the last minute.

And the best we

can say in looking at it, not knowing which expert is going
to be attached to that document that is going to use it, is
simply that it has never been authenticated.

We don't even

know what it is or what it is purported to show.

So I hope

that explains why we havenlt made that sort of challenge.
Certainly if they come forward with a new expert, we will
make that challenge.

It just hasn't been identified yet.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. OLSON:

One issue, Your Honor, that hasn't been

addressed at all today, is the new Utah employees.

And I

don't know if you want any argument today --
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THE COURT:

Attorney' s fees.

MR. OLSON;

-- with respect to attorney's fees.

We

fully briefed that.
THE COURT:

Right.

My theory was to park that issue

down the road frankly because

—

MR. OLSON:

Happy to park it.

THE COURT:

The reason was I'm still , hope springs

That is fine.

eternal, hoping for some sort of a resolution of the matter
without the court's intervention.

And it seemed to me

leaving that out there for a while might be desirable.
MR. OLSON:

I understand.

We're happy to do that.

Just finally, and just 20 more seconds, ultimately where
we're left with in this case is nominal damages.

The

statement that has been made, I think Mr. Ingram mentioned,
that we can figure it out somehow, relating to the amount of
damages.

I think Mr. Johnson conceded we don't know what

the amount of damages is.
imprecise.

It is difficult.

It is tough to put a finger on.

It is
The result in

those cases, and those situations, is an award of nominal
damages.

And that is what the court stated in the Turtle

Management, case where the court said, quote, if the amount
of damages has not been proven, end quote, nominal damages
is the measure.
So at best, they're entitled to nominal damages in a
ceise

like this where it is not a matter of damages being
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difficult to prove, it is a matter of not having any witness
who can come forward and testify to some specific amount of
damages that was caused by any specific breach of contract
or tortious action.
THE COURT:

Let's go back to what the state of the law

is on the restitutionary theory of damage.
is helpful.

Your break down

We need to think about torts and we need to

thing about breaches of contract.

The Massachusetts case is

a tort case and I guess Sampson is a tort case, is that -MR. OLSON;

I'm sorry, which one is a tort case?

THE COURT:

Their case, their best case is a

Massachusetts tort case.
Sampson which is a —

And then you come back with

is that a -- that is a tort case,

right?
MR. OLSON:

Right.

And the other two Idaho tort cases

that recognize that same restatement provision which are the
Barlow case and the Safeco case which all recognize lost
profits.

Particularly the Nora v Safeco Insurance case

which recognizes lost profits is the measure, Barlow
recognizes the restatement.

Those are both tortious

interference cases in Idaho.
THE COURT:

This Massachusetts case is a 1976 case and

it collects a bunch of law review articles talking about
what seems to be the hot new theory, you know, lost profit,
you know, restitution.

I'm wondering whether this is
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something that was all in vogue 30 years ago, but, you know,
the law professors didn•z carry the day in the intervening
three decades or something.
MR. OLSON:

Do you have any

I can only guess.

—

I haven't read the law

review articles in any detail, but I do know that the
tortious interference cases that we have cited all happened
after the Massachusetts case*

So, you know, the fact that

there is one Massachusetts case that goes that way, I would
say, is not sufficient for the court to go that direction
particularly the Utah Idaho cases that we have.

So I think

if there is going to be any certification, it certainly
wouldn't relate to tortious interference which has been
established already•
THE COURT:

I haven't had a chance to review all of

the defendants cases and my instinct is, and I'm sure
they'll let me know if I'm wrong, the cases they have got on
restitutionary damages are tort cases because there, and
that is maybe when I was talking to Mr. Gibb, I'm thinking
kind of criminal.

And tort law, of course, is separate from

criminal law but it does bear some relationship.

And the

theory being just as the bank robber has to give his money
back, there is an argument, as articulated by the
Massachusetts court, that a tort feasor ought to give his
money back.

And that is —

maybe that is the analogy.

The

analogy would not work very well in a contract situation
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because I mean there we're just protecting economic
expectations and BO forth.
MR. OLSON:
there.

Right.

But I understand the similarity

Unfortunately, it has just not been —

shouldn't say unfortunately.

Fortunately --

THE COURT:

Fortunately for you.

MR. OLSON:

That is right.

rejected by Utah and Idaho.

well, I

It is —

that has been

And then going to the —

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. OLSON:

Going to the contract cases then, if you

want a break down of those, we did need to look at what is
left.
THE COURT:

No.

I think based on our discussion now,

it doesn't sound like the analogy is going to work in
contract cases at all so we don't need to get there.
MR. OLSON:
MR, GIBB:
point out.

Okay.

Great, thank you.

Your Honor, just one thing that I would

Under traditional court tort analysis, you have

a duty, a breach, you have causation and then you have
damages.

And so the measure of damages is determined after

you show that there was damages that were proximately caused
CLS a result of that breach.

Causation still occurs whether

it is a tort or a contract because in a contract case you
have got a breach that then proximately causes damages.

So

in both of those contexts, causation is a critical analysis
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to make in both sets of circumstances.
finds that there indeed has been

And if the court

no evidence of causation

presented on summary judgment, the court can show or can
state, as a matter of law, that the claims should be
dismissed as to both types of claims no matter what the

—

under either of those traditional analysis.
THE COURT:

The problem I'm having is I think

Mr. Johnson, aided by Mr. Ingram and Ms. Waite-Grover, make
a pretty persuasive case that hey the jury could find, based
on all of the evidence we have got, that there was at least
we suffered some damages.

Where they're having more

difficulty is all right is that one dollar or is it 2.7
million dollars.
MR. GIBB:
THE COURT:

Exactly.
When we get there, what the Massachusetts

court says that I found persuasive on quick read is we don't
want to create a world where tort feasors can say well, um,
I'll make a ton of money if I do this, and I'll bet they're
not going to be, you know, my gain will exceed their loss so
I'm going to go ahead and commit the tort.
kind of efficient tort and
MR. GIBB:

It will be some

—

I guess I would suggest the situation here

is a little different in the —

from the perspective that we

have now had full summary judgment relief on the issue of
whether or not there is evidence of causation or not.

The
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evidence that they presented on summary judgment as they
argued it in their memorandum was that Mr. Elggren was their
causation evidence with respect to that.
had to switch because Mr. Elggren was —

And they have now
was excluded from

trial, but they argued in their summary judgment memorandum,
I believe it was in their reply memorandum, that you can
infer that from his report.

With the report excluded, they

are now faced with the full analysis from Mr. Rasmussen that
is unrebutted that goes through all of those causation
factors and finds that there is no causation that has been
demonstrated in this case.
THE COURT:

Well, I mean I have to say I do think we

have switched course a little bit because Ms. Waite-Grover's
position today was well he just assumed causation that is
why you let him in.

And I do think that a couple of weeks

ago it was more along the lines you4re describing.

It may

be I misunderstand the —
MR* GIBB:

I believe in the deposition testimony he --

the quote from Mr. Elggren is I said I did not address
causation and that is in his deposition at 201 and 202.

It

is not that he assumed it, it is that he never even
addressed it.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

I think I understand

your position.
MR. GIBB:

Thank you, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:
MR* INGRAM:

Thank you, Mr. Gibb.
Your Honor, first of all, there is a

concern between distinguishing between the torts and the
breach of contract.

I think the case that is especially

illustrated why both the tort and the contract are
intertwined is the Storage Tech case which is not a 30 year
old case, it is from 2005.

There at issue you have tortious

interference and breaches of non-compete covenants and
employee non-compete covenants.

And there is a direct

citation to the restatement 774(a) which is the same
restatement relied upon in both Utah and Idaho and
determining the proper measure of damages from the tort.

If

you read the Storage Tech case.
THE COURT:

Tell you what, give me just a minute here

and have me focus in on the language,
here in front of me-

I have got it right

This is the Eighth Circuit predicting

what Minnesota would do.

And they predicted that Minnesota

would allow a restitutionary remedy in a case in which the
interference alleged was inducing employee's breach of
non-competition and non-disclosure covenant.

And that is

the restitutionary remedy of the type we have been talking
about.
MR. INGRAM:

And the reason why they're intertwined,

if you read that case carefully, one of the big things at
issue was non-disclosure of confidential information.

And
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that, that in and of itself, takes you to the next step as
well.

Why is restitution not a proper measure of damage of

breach of contract case?

Well, in an ordinary contract you

don't have all of these legitimate business interests that
we have been talking about.
contract.

This is not an ordinary

These are special contracts.

That is why we have

been arguing at length over whether or not there is a
legitimate protectable interest in there.

And in the cases

in both Utah and Idaho where they're -- not Utah but just
Idaho and some other cases we have been talking about lost
profits with those contracts, the only legitimate interest
at issue in those cases is really addressing was the
solicitation of customers.

What you have is an easy

recognition of customer A to customer B.

And what they're

not addressing are these other legitimate interests like
non-compete or, excuse me, the non-confidential information,
extraordinary training.

Those types of cases, based upon

the Storage Tech case, actually lend themselves to
restitutionary measure of damages.
cases you can't simply say it —

Why?

Because in those

you can't simply point to a

loss to TruGreen because of the breach of its -- the loss of
its confidential information and loss of competitive
advantage.

What you have instead is again this jump of a

learning curve.

It is not so much that TruGreen is so down,

although they are down, it is that the defendants have been
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able to overnight make this jump based upon this training,
this confidential information. That is why restitutionary
measure of damages is appropriate to again put the defendant
-- put them in the place where we were before the breach
which is the competitive advantage that TruGreen had that
they had earned through years and years of investing these
guys, spending money and knowing the Utah market.
THE COURT:

I agree with that.

If I were king for a

day, I would say restitutionary damages ought to be the law.
But, of course, I am not king, I'm interpreting what Utah
and Idaho courts would do. And so why don't you tell me
what you think.
MR, INGRAM:

First of all in Utah you would find

nothing on the proper measure of damages in a breach of
non-compete covenant. Absolutely nothing. The only thing
you will find is injunctive relief.
THE COURT: So should I certify the question in your
view or should I just rule in your favor without certifying?
You want me to rule now?
MR. INGRAM:

I would like you to rule in our favor.

Go ahead.
THE COURT:

I mean, what — what would — is there

anything in, I mean, can I just say by golly I read some law
review article and it sounds like a nifty theory to me and
I'll bet the Utah courts will buy into this nifty theory.
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MR. INGRAM:

Yeah, we can find a basis for the measure

of damages in Utah and tort claim at 774(a) .

It is the same

restatement cited in the Storage Tech case which then takes
the added step of applying that to a breach of non-compete
covenant where you have all these other interests at issue.
Not just some ordinary contract.

Jm, couple that with the

fact Utah never ruled on what the proper measure is damage
breach of non-compete and they never addressed the proper
measure of damages in light of all of the legitimate
protectable interests like confidential information, like
training.
So frankly it is wide open.
the case of these other states.

You have got to look at

Coupled with the fact if

you look to Utah law, well, um, if you can show misuse of a
trade secret, for example, Utah statute provides, and this
is in TruGreen in the TruGreen summary judgment brief, Utah
statute provides that the proper measure of damages both
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff and the restitutionary
measure of damages for the misuse of that trade secret.

I

think that gets you where I'm going which is in a sense of
pointing us in the right direction which is the reason why
restitutionary measure of damages is simply because you
don't have customer A to customer B problem which naturally
lends itself to a natural loss theory like competition,
confidential information, misuse of training, misuse of the
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investment that TruGreen has made, also lends itself to a
more restitutionary measure of damages.

If you look at the

Dunn case, too, for example, urn —
THE COURT:

Dunn is squarely against you.

It says the

measure is not the amount of profits made by the defendants.
MR. INGRAM:

That case involves the sale of a business

and non-compete covenant is ancillary to that sale.

So

consequently, you don't have the protectable interests like
we 1 re talking about in this case which is the special
investment in employees, the confidential information.

What

you have in the Dunn case and in the case that it cites to,
is the purchaser of the business paying a sum of money to
buy that goodwill, and that is kind of -- that is where
they're going with those.

But it is definitely not an

employee case where you are talking about training and
legitimate, you know, confidential information not types of
interests.

Urn —

THE COURT:
certification.

So let me just, hear you a little more on

What is that?

I mean I kind of hear you

saying it is an open question and we think on the open
question we have got the better of the argument.
you opposed to the certification?

I mean are

In favor of it?

Ambivalent?
MR. INGRAM:
THE COURT:

Maybe I'll let Mr- Johnson speak to that.
I fm glad to hear him.
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MR. JOHNSON: My thoughts oh that are as follows, Your
Honor.

I do think in Utah, although there is —

it is one

way to analyze it is to, I think, defendants sort of boast
of that as well, it is silent.

I do think that all of the

indicators are, given the restatement, section 707(4) and the
fact that they haven't been presented with that kind of
case, that they probably would go that direction. Do I want
to spend the court's time and my time on an uncertainty?
No.

So if I'm not going to get it now, I would rather be

certified then try and go through three years and then
appeal. Does that make sense to you?

Do you follow?

THE COURT: As a practical matter, I know we're
talking about -- I have certified I don't do this all the
time*

I have been on the bench four and a half years now

and I have done it twice. And they both have been
situations like this where all of a sudden we're close to
trial and here is an issue, and you know, I am - and I'm
thinking what it will do is slow the case down for about a
year. Obviously they have their processes for briefing and
so forth, and we would have an answer in a year. And if
they say — I mean I am still — if they say that the tort
theory restitutionary measure of damages works, then I think
you definitely are up and running.
MR. JOHNSON: And I think personally I believe your
instincts are correct. And I just assume you say it now.
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But if I have a choice between saying it in summary judgment
or saying it as a law of the case before we try it or going
through the risk of, you know, I guess certification is not
the best remedy but it is better than spending an awful lot
of money only to find out that somebody second-guessed you*
Do you follow me?
THE COURT:

Right.

MR, JOHNSON:

No one is going to second guess on an

issue like this issue of state law in the Utah Supreme Court
once it speaks.

I do —

I would just say in passing, that

I'm not as comfortable with reading the language in Dunn
which granted it is sort of like a movie review.

You read

the movie review, this movie is great, but there is an
ellipses after that that says and there was a comma that
said not really.

Like the Borat movie, I can't remember

what the line was he kept saying in Borat, but where he
would pause, he never got at it.
to a pretty precise set of facts.

But that case is limited
And Idaho, like Utah, I

mean yeah you can read it and maybe that is an indicator of
how the Idaho Supreme Court would go given a case where you
have the inchoate protectable business interest at play
here.

But I'm not so sure they would.

that have seen

I think the states

those kind of cases, like the Minnesota case

and the Idaho case, I mean the Minnesota case and
Massachusetts case, are cases that do go to the
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restitutionary remedy.
hard to prove.

Keeping in mind that boy these are

The problem is you —

your instincts tell

you has been exacerbated by the defendant not the plaintiff.
And am I going to set a policy here and encourage people to
commit torts who is the guy in Chicago, the guy that taught
torts there, who was always, you know
THE COURT:

Epstein.

MR. JOHNSON:
theory.

—

Epstein is the efficient tort feasor

I think that is the problem.

Idaho court case,

And I'm not sure the

although the language is pretty broad,

given the narrow controversy of that case, ought to be read
that broad.

So I would like it certified on that issue.

And I'm not stipulating that the Idaho court is entirely
can be read entirely comfortably that way.

—

I think it is a

very narrow case.
THE COURT:

Occasionally a federal district court will

certify some question and then it will get back something
from the State Supreme Court saying you idiot, didn't you
read -MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Maybe we ought to brief it first then.

Well, I mean I don't know.

You can spill

a lot of ink, but I'm sitting here looking at the paragraphs
and it starts out saying the measure of damage for the
breach of an anti-competition clause is the amount that the
plaintiff lost by reason of the breach.
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MR, JOHNSON:

But in that case, again it is ancillary

to a sale of business, in that case I believe and I don't
have in front of me, that they used as part of that measure
the gain to the breaching party in that case,
THE COURT:

But that —

they said the gain was that

they thought there was some equation between the gain to the
defendant

—

MR. JOHNSON:

And that is because it is one of those

very easy to show a lost profit damage.

It is a much

tighter case than the inchoate business case which I think
has arisen here and in Minnesota and Massachusetts,
THE COURT:

I don't think I can say a dollar that they

gained was a dollar that you lost.
there was the flavor of that.

I think in this case

They may be —

I don't know

maybe every dollar they gained was at your expense but maybe
not.

And that is the problem I am —
MR. JOHNSON:

But you would —

I think the court might

concede it is not a case where somebody's goodwill has been
confiscated, where somebody's competitive advantage has been
destroyed.

It is simply a commitment that was made in

connection with the sale of business.

And we have one of

these very same cases right now in Idaho, set for hearing on
the 2 6th, and it is ancillary to a sale of business.

They

are much easier cases.
THE COURT:

I see.

I mean you were wondering —

you
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made a good point earlier this morning when you talked about
what kind of a message does this send about the
enforceability of these agreements-

I did notice one of the

Utah cases had a liquidated damages clause and maybe that is
another way -MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT;

That could be the solution.

Where you are an employer and TruGreen,

Scotts has similar -- maybe that is the way to do these.
Although part of the problem there were some obviously some
drafting problems by your clients on some of these.
MR. JOHNSON:

Although my fingerprints are on many of

these difficulties of the case, they're not on the drafting
of the clause.
THE COURT:

The clause said while employed byf you

know, we agree not to compete while we are employed and then
they left.

I mean that seemed to me to be something.

I

think we had differences of opinion on how that should have
been interpreted, but I think we could both agree that could
have been written a lot more straightforwardly so
MR. JOHNSON:

Yes.

I agree with that.

—

If Your Honor

has no more questions, I will submit it.
THE COURT;
MR. GIBB:

Okay.
Just two cases I wanted to discuss and then

just briefly some traditional damage analysis, Your Honor.
In Dunn the court notes that Dunn failed to present evidence
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at all showing any loss of business, loss of customers or
loss of profit to his own business attributable towards
breach.

In addition, although Dunn presented some proof of

profits, he failed to show any relation between those
profits and Dunn's losses.
Now, I'm also interested to hear them argue Storage
Tech, because that was very well discussed in the court's
prior order.

And I know it was some interest as well that

that case involved, according to the court's prior opinion,
claims of interference with contractual relations, breach of
contract, corporate raiding, conversion, misappropriation of
trade secrets, and breach of fiduciary duties.
But, in that particular case, the Eighth Circuit found
that Storage Tech failed to produce evidence supporting any
amount of damages or restitution.

The dispute arose because

of the hiring of those employees.

But the court found that

even if it were to adopt either of those, that he should be
excluded for the quoted reason which is the first and most
apparent problem with Norton's testimony is that he
attributed the entire value of the New Speed acquisition to
employees and trade secrets wrongfully appropriated from
Storage Technology.

Even though New Speed had other assets

and employees, Norton did not attempt to value the people or
the technology supposedly belonging to Storage Tech by any
means other than by ascertaining what prices they paid for
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New Speed.
I think we are really very close, if not identical, to
that certain situation because they had failed to do, on
summary judgment, the very things that are discussed in the
Storage Tech case.

And like the expert there, this expert

failed to do so and they are left without evidence at
summary judgment to show those very important things.
Now under traditional damage analysis you have two
scenarios really, Your Honor.

You can try to show it from

contract that we got that they did not realize on.

In other

words, a customer contract that they wouldn't realize on and
shown lost profits as a result of that.

And then to show

causation and all of the other factors that they're required
to.

They failed to do that here.
With respect to how they have tried to go and do that,

•like in the Dunn case, they have gone and just simply said
profits are ours.
between those two.

But they have shown no correlation
They have shown no causation between

those two and they haven't attempted to rebut
Mr. Rasmussen's sworn statement which is now before the
court.
Moving to certification, we will be happy to have the
court certify it if that is what it feels it needs to do.
We can assist the court if the court would like with short
briefs on what we think the text of the certification order
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should be to the Supreme Court.

But in any event, in our

view, if the court were to certify to the Supreme Court, it
should only certify obviously the Utah issues regarding Utah
employees and in the remaining claims that remain before the
court.
THE COURT:

That is right.

And it would be limited to

a tort, to the tort issue not a —
MR. GIBB:
THE COURT:

Well

—

Or do you see both?

I think I would

certify whether Utah law recognizes in a tort action a
restitutionary measure of damages that is gained to a
defendant being handed over to a plaintiff.
MR. GIBB:

Well, I guess what I would say is what

should be rather than suggest the outcome, the certification
question is what is the appropriate measure of damages if in
an interference case involving non-competition and other
covenants or whatever.
MR. OLSON:

Do you see what I'm saying there?

Your Honor, if I could just interject, and

I'm sorry to tag team with Mr. Gibb, but I think that the
issue that appeared to be left after our discussion was not
the tort cases, because again it is triggering and conceded
that section 774(a) has already been decided in Utah,
already been established what the measure of damages is in
these tortious interference cases.

What the court

recognized was that in the Utah breach of contract context,
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Lt was unclear when we have the Robbins case which is this
liquidated damages case,
calculated.

how exactly damages would be

That was my impression on what was left.

THE COURT:

Maybe I need to be —

Sampson was a tort

case, right?
MR. OLSON:

That is right.

THE COURT:

So it seems to me —

I don't think that

plaintiffs have any case law that says you would recognize
the restitutionary measure of damages in a contract
situation.
MR. OLSON:

Well, I agree with that.

THE COURT:

Maybe I should ask the plaintiffs that.

Do you —

you have got a good Massachusetts case on a tort

claim and Storage Tech is a tort/ as I understand it.
MS. WAITE-GROVER:
MR. GIBB:

We have shown —

I think it is both, Your Honor,

Storage

Tech is.
THE COURT:
MR. GIBB:

Storage Tech is both.
Yeah.

It is a breach of contract case as

well.
MS. WAITE-GROVER:

Storage Tech essentially involves a

case that is very similar to here.

There was an employment

agreement that had two provisions in it, non-competition and
non-disclosure of confidential information.

One of the

defendants in there was the employee defendant who had

93

allegedly breached the competition provision and the
disclosure provision.

The other defendant was the

competitor who had hired this employee in violation of the
competition agreement and had allegedly used the
confidential information of the other party of the plaintiff
including the employee.
The analysis that the court made in that case, and the
reasoning that it uses, is really critical.

It says where

the underlying breach would have supported a restitutionary
measure of damages, the tortious interference measure of
damages will mirror that.

And I think that pleads very well

into the restatement which Storage Tech did cite.
the restatement essentially says when you —

Because

when you induce

someone to breach a contract, you're going to be liable for
the same thing that the person is liable for because of that
breach.

In the Storage Tech case the court went back and

said look an employee in Minnesota who breaches a
non-competition agreement and disclosures confidential
information, not trade secrets, but just confidential
information, could be required to account for its profits.
And that word accounting is essentially restitution.

You

give back what you got, because the profits that you got
because you disclosed the information, you competed.

And so

then the court went on to say, if that employee who breaches
that agreement can be required to account for the profits
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and the revenues gained from the breach, so too will the
competitor who induces the employee's breach of the
non-competition and nondisclosure agreement.
What we do know about Utah and Idaho law is both
recognized generally speaking restitution with respect to
contract damages.

You can get an expectancy measure' of

damages, but in certain circumstances you could get
restitution.

It is within the jurisprudence of both states,

essentially.

Second, what we also know about both Utah and

Idaho law, is that if you do something akin to
non-disclosure of confidential information, which is the
misappropriation of the trade secrets, you're not only
liable for your actual losses, but under the statute you can
be liable for a restitution of the gains that you get
because you misappropriated the trade secret.

And then

third, with respect to the non-interference provisions at
issue in this contract
THE COURT:

—

Before you move on, are all of the —

thought all of the —

I

are all of the trade secret claims out

at this point now?
MR. JOHNSON:
MR. INGRAM:

No.
No, Your Honor, they're still at issue.

Breach of non-competition, breach of non-disclosure and
breach of non-interference covenants, those are all at
issue.
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THE COURT:

Weren't there some —

I'm trying to

remember my summary judgment order, weren't there -- there
was ex-appropriation of confidential information or
something that got tossed out in the earlier order.
MR. INGRAM:

The only thing that was tossed out was

solicitation of customers.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Not -- and I can —

It is what it is,

I'm just trying

to get that front-loaded here.
MS. WAITE-GROVER:

And then the non-interference

provision that still remains at issue in this case is
essentially interference with other employees which is
interference with employee contracts.

And we think that is

essentially contractual version of the tortious and
interfering.

They agreed by contract not to interfere with

their fellow TruGreen employees agreement or employment
situation and agreement, whereas the Mower Brothers
defendants just didn't have that contractually imposed duty
but had the legally imposed duty via tort law.

At any rate,

we think that the reasoning used in Storage Tech, that is
that the underlying —

where the underlying breach was to

support restitutionary measure of damages justifies
restitutionary damages for tortious interference with that
same contract is sound and would be recognized in Utah.
restatement mirrors that.

The

It is -- it says you get -- when

you tortiously interfere you have to pay up what the person
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who breached the contract would have paid.

We think that

because a non-competition agreement is different than an
ordinary contract since it is not a contract for the sale of
goods or the sale or the performance and services, that it
would justify a restitutionary measure of damages.

What a

person in an ordinary contract is trying to protect is lost
profits.

I'm going to-pay you $100, give me 100 widgets.

want to get the 100 widgets that are worth something.

I

If

I'm going to pay you $100 to paint my fence, you have got to
pay my fence or I'm out $100.
What TruGreen and similar employees are trying to
protect in their non-competition agreement is not just a
loss of profits, although they may realize that that can be
an outcome of a breach.

But really what they're trying to

protect is the goodwill, the competitive fairness, and the
unique services of their employees, all of which are
abstracting things which we have discussed previously but
are difficult to pin down to a monetary value unlike a
contract that is simply about 100 widgets or painting a
fence.
So for that reason we think that there is good reason,
there is good reasoning 'behind applying that measure of
damages for both the breach of the non-competition agreement
and the non-disclosure agreement and the non-interference
agreement and the tortious interference with those two
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provisions.
THE COURT:

I mean your closing line there was that

there are good reasons for doing all of this.

And when I

came out here I'm with you on that, I think there are good
reasons for doing this.

But there is a separate question as

to whether Utah law would follow.

I mean is there something

in the Utah case law that leads you to think that the Utah
courts have moved in that direction?
MS. WAITE-GROVER:

Urn, I know that they'll get

injunctive relief for non-competition agreements.
that they'll give —

I know

they*11 acknowledge in certain part

based on Robbins versus Finlay liquidated damages in
non-competition agreements, and I think that we might need
to do additional assessment of when restitution is
appropriate in general contracts.

But I can speak to the

fact that Utah does acknowledge restitution towards general
contracts, but I fully concede that they have never
addressed the specific issue of whether restitution is the
appropriate measure in a non-competition contract.

They

haven't ruled it out either, but they haven't addressed it.
THE COURT:

All right.

MS. WAITE-GROVER:

It may be appropriate for

certification.
THE COURT:

All right.

Well here is where we are.

seems to me three things could happen over the next week.

It
I
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could rule for the defense and then we're done.

And you can

check with the Tenth Circuit and see if I made a mistake.

I

could rule for you, and then we would be moving forward for
a trial.

Or I could certify this to the Utah Courts for

clarification.

And you all

MR. JOHNSON:

—

In the words of Meatloaf, two out of

three ain't bad, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And the problem is you all are spending a
lot of client money here.
do.

This is what 1 would propose to

I'm going to work on this today and tomorrow and maybe

give you a phone call, both sides, with the same information
as to which of those paths I'm heading so you would know by
the end of the day tomorrow what the situation is.

The

problem is if I rule for the plaintiff, then we have got a
final pretrial conference and trial and we have got a lot of
work that we need to do on this so you need to know that
rapidly.

One of the other two courses then the trial isn't

looming quickly.

Does that —

does that make sense as a

plan of attack here?
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Does that make sense as a plan of attack

here?
MR. GIBB:
THE COURT:
tomorrow.

Yes, Your Honor.
All right.

So I'll give you a call

And I guess if we're done, if it is one of these
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options that is going to put the trial off, we don't have to
really think through anything.

If the option is to rule

—

well, I really don't see how I could rule for you.
I think Ms. Waite-Grover is exactly right when she
says the Utah law really isn' t there.

I mean I think I

would be walking out on a limb to rule in your favor on that
theory.

And I'm not sure I would be doing you any favors

because you could spend a lot of money.
All right.

Hang on one second.

Well, I'll let you know tomorrow.

But

sitting here right now, my thought is that we're not going
to have a trial because I'm either going to certify it or
rule for the defense.
am thinking about.

That is sort of the two things that I

But why don't I do this.

I'll let you

know by 5:00 tomorrow what exactly what the situation is so
that there won't be any unnecessary expenditure of funds
over the next few weeks if we are not going to have a trial.
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

All right.

Thank you, counsel.

I

appreciate the arguments of counsel today and I'll try to
get you a ruling as quickly as I can tomorrow.
MR. GIBB:

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. OLSON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you,

(Whereupon, the hearing concluded at 1:38 p.m.)
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